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ABSTRACT
Despite significant research, the challenge of mapping the physical topology of large
networks remains a relatively unsolved problem. Although it possesses numerous ramifi-
cations for Internet security and resiliency, physical network geolocation research has not
matched corresponding advancements made in logical topology mapping. This thesis pro-
poses net.Tagger: a novel approach to network infrastructure mapping that combines smart-
phone apps with crowdsourced collection to gather data for offline aggregation and analy-
sis. The project aims to build a map of physical network infrastructure such as fiber-optic
cables, facilities, and access points. The net.Tagger project aligns to the OpenStreetMap
project, a proven, open-source framework for managing crowdsourced map data. This the-
sis delivers a working proof-of-concept system for further research, including a smartphone
app for gathering physical topology data, and the backend services to process and store it.
We also present the results of an initial release to 25 users, analysing collection trends and
extrapolating to predict potential findings of a future large-scale release.
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Physical network topology mapping represents a counterpart to mapping large-scale net-
works at more abstract levels. Many research groups have expended substantial efforts to
map networks on the Internet Protocol (IP) level or higher. These efforts have resulted in
a rich collection of data and tools useful for understanding the Internet’s virtual structure.
However, the underlying physical infrastructure of cables and the equipment they connect
such as routers, data centers and Internet Service Provider (ISP) Point of Presences (POPs)
is not as well understood on a fine-grained level.
1.1 Problem
It may appear contradictory that current research is better adapted to model the fluctuating
virtual interconnections of the Internet instead of the static hardware that carries its traffic,
but this is precisely the case for several reasons. Primarily, difficulties in mapping arise
because the physical topology of a network need not match its virtual configuration. For
economical, performance, and security reasons, trying to configure a network to match its
physical makeup would be ill-advised even if possible. Traditional network mapping tools
thus cannot be used for physical analysis without introducing substantial sources of error.
An additional hindrance to the availability of static hardware information involves the com-
plex relationships between ISPs, public utility managers, and government regulators that
leaves researchers without a centralized source of information. Large swaths of the physical
Internet are installed, managed, and regulated by different parties that have little business
incentive to communicate beyond their sphere of influence. Much of the information that
would be beneficial to researchers is considered proprietary and not released by its cor-
porate owners. Certain vendors compile and offer limited maps using ISP data, but this
information is usually sold instead of made publicly available. Also, data pinpointing static
hardware locations is based on what its owner claims is correct, usually leaving it phys-
ically unverified [1]. A final obstacle to advances in physical network mapping centers
around the current publicly available data repositories that focus almost entirely on core
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Internet backbone infrastructure [2]. A quality, publicly available, and consolidated source
of low-level infrastructure does not exist at this time.
The prevalence of these challenges to network topology mapping has resulted in the rate of
large-scale network expansion largely outpacing the ability of researchers to keep it phys-
ically catalogued. A strong argument can be made for the timely amelioration of these
challenges, because understanding the composition and connections of the Internet not
only provides valuable theoretical data to computer scientists, but is vital for the develop-
ment of resiliency. Internet services play a central role in the commercial, government,
and military sectors, and failures in reliability or performance have potentially serious con-
sequences. Although Internet resiliency impacts both the national economy and security,
it is not achievable without knowledge of the basic structure of the networks themselves.
Because Internet traffic is usually consolidated in transit through several key points on the
Internet’s “backbone,” a failure at any of these points could prove catastrophic. Compre-
hending the structure of the Internet gives both the government and industry the ability to
diagnose weak points and build in redundancy where needed.
Critics of attempts to publicly map key network infrastructure contend these efforts serve
as intelligence that attackers can use to plot operations. Their solution has been to either
discourage extensive mapping or secure the results from public release. While a “security
through obscurity” approach aligns with conventional military thought, the larger civilian
security community sees this as a flawed approach. Their counterpoint normally states
that true security lies in finding and fixing flaws instead of hiding them in hopes that they
will not be discovered. The magnitude of this research problem is so great that multiple
approaches from different research teams building on and collaborating with each other is
necessary to yield results. Such efforts cannot exist without open exchange and publication
of results.
Critics also need to be reminded that threats to the infrastructure can come not only from
intentional sources such as terrorist attacks, but also from accidents or natural disasters. Un-
dersea Fiber Optic Cables (FOCs) are frequently severed by boat anchors or other sources.
In 2008, three cables were severed within days of each other in the Mediterranean and Mid-
dle East, reducing traffic capacity in some areas by up to 70% [3]. Natural disasters such
as hurricanes or earthquakes can cause similar damage on land. Because these vulnerabili-
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ties are not predicated on human knowledge, not mapping or securing knowledge of them
provides no benefits. They present risks similar to intentional attack or sabotage, with the
best means of remediation being awareness of network structure so one may analyse for
vulnerabilities in order to correct them.
1.2 Research Question
This thesis seeks to investigate several questions:
• What type and quantity of data must an app transmit to produce a useful data point?
Given the constraints of an app transmission given available sensor data, privacy
concerns, and bandwidth constraints, how can net.Tagger optimize a user’s submis-
sion to gain enough information to reliably determine what exists at and what can be
extrapolated from a given geographical position?
• What is the optimal User Interface (UI) to reduce erroneous submissions and pro-
vide user feedback? Within the realm of the user’s experience, any interactions must
produce accurate data and prevent the user from continuing to submit data out of
boredom or frustration. Since the average user will not be able to identify telecom-
munications infrastructure indicators without training, the app must provide basic
instructions on what to look for. Furthermore, crowdsourcing relies on the enthu-
siasm of its users to continue submitting based on whatever incentive they receive
from participating. net.Tagger does not pay its participants, however initiatives such
as the OpenStreetMaps (OSM) foundation have received open source mapping sub-
missions from hundreds of thousands of unpaid volunteers without offering com-
pensation. net.Tagger must be able to provide appropriate nontangible incentives or
feedback to encourage participation and repeated submissions.
• How feasible is extrapolation from submissions to mapping inferences? net.Tagger
works by identifying nodes based on user observations, but creating a map requires
some means of correctly connecting the nodes. Based on initial data collection, how
difficult is it to accurately generate map inferences?
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1.3 Contribution
In addition to investigating the aforementioned research questions, the main contribution of
this thesis project is creation of a working app/backend. Analysis of topics such as usability,
data requirements, and findings analysis are explored, however this project serves primarily
as the inception of net.Tagger, with the intent that future student researchers will further
develop the initiative into a mature entity providing a previously unattempted approach to
a major outstanding research area.
1.4 Thesis Organization
Chapter 2 provides an overview of existing physical mapping techniques, the crowdsourced
mapping community, and telecommunications infrastructure types relevant to this project.
Chapter 3 lays out the framework of net.Tagger’s different components as well as design
choices and the actual project development.
Chapter 4 describes the testing methods used to evaluate net.Tagger and results from initial
field testing and deployment.
Chapter 5 evaluates the conclusions of the project. Answers to the research questions are
explored, looking at preliminary conclusions about applying crowdsourced mapping to net-
work topologies. Given this project’s scope as the foundation of a larger, ongoing initiative,






This chapter provides a brief survey of physical network topology mapping topics as they
apply to this thesis. The structure of the Internet at a physical level is briefly described, with
an emphasis on long-haul FOC conduits and the “Internet backbone.” A number of policy-
based decisions made within recent years are also explored as driving forces shaping the
expansion of large-scale networks. These include Dig-Once laws, federal broadband ex-
pansion initiatives, and Right-Of-Way (ROW) lawsuits. Justification is given for the neces-
sity of historical approaches to physical topology, including measurement-based strategies
such as Constraint Based Geolocation (CBG) and DNS-Based Router Positioning (DRoP)
as well as compilation-based approaches such as the Internet Topology Zoo.
2.2 Physical Internet Design
2.2.1 Organization
From a high-level perspective, the Internet can be studied and modeled at several levels [1].
The highest level is modelled in terms of organizations, which we define as entities under
self control that are not subservient to other organizations. Based on structure and policy,
each organization manages one or more IP prefixes known as Autonomous Systems (ASs).
An AS is defined by RFC1930 [4] as
a connected group of one or more IP prefixes run by one or more network
operators which has a SINGLE and CLEARLY DEFINED routing policy.
Because organizations often wish to divide their network assets into subsections to ac-
commodate complex structures and routing policies, a complex organization will own and
operate several ASs. Organizations do not just include ISPs, but can also be government
and educational institutions, corporate enterprises, and content providers. At the AS level,
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these provider-level networks peer with each other at Internet Exchange Points (IXPs) and
private points based on policy agreements [5]. The AS level is responsible for much of the
truth behind the common networking idiom that “traffic does not follow the shortest path
between two points, but the cheapest.” At the POP level, an ISP aggregates routers and
modems in a physical location (the POP itself) that provide a means for a local network of
consumers to connect to the larger Internet backbone. The IP level consists of individually
addressable end-hosts, aggregated subnets, and the router-level connectivity that joins the
two. The IP level perspective of large-scale networks is frequently referred to as the “log-
ical” layer, i.e., the organization and interconnections of individual network hosts depends
upon the network’s logical configuration instead of their physical location.
Finally, the physical layer consists largely of cables (fiber-optic or copper) and link-layer
switching infrastructure. The physical layer can take other forms as well through mediums
such as satellite Internet, however the core global Internet infrastructure utilizes FOC.
2.2.2 Long-Haul Geography
Because the logical topology of a network can be configured independently of its physical
make-up, providers usually employ cost-saving measures to consolidate and share infras-
tructure. The “Internet backbone” is mostly comprised of FOC long-haul conduits, a term
that is not precisely defined but can be generally described. One project [6] defined a long-
haul conduit within the scope of their research as one either spanning at least 30 miles,
connecting population centers of at least 100,000 people, or housing the cables of at least
two providers. They define them more informally as “a ‘tube’ or trench specifically built to
house the fiber of potentially multiple providers.”
Long-haul conduits are frequently (but not unconditionally) placed adjacent to existing
transportation infrastructure such as highways and railways. While expanding to meet
growing consumer demand, long-haul networks can experience legal and logistical diffi-
culties similar to other large-scale distribution networks such as railroads, power transmis-
sion lines, and petroleum pipelines. The mechanism that traditional utility networks utilize
in many situations is the ROW, an easement between a landowner and a service provider
seeking usage rights but not ownership of a section of private property. ROWs are char-
acterized by binding legal contracts between the property holder and service provider that
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can be overseen by state commerce departments in order to ensure due process and eq-
uity, even in cases involving consensual agreements instead of eminent domain. However,
lawsuits by property owners against ISPs show cases where ROWs were not observed in
cases of long-haul FOCs laid alongside infrastructure such as rail lines. In 2013, Sprint
Communications Co and WilTel Communications were ordered to pay $770,000 to 1,888
Connecticut property owners after the telecommunications providers negotiated with rail-
road companies to lay FOC along existing ROWs instead of negotiating with the property
owners for a new easement [7]. Because the ROWs contracts only granted permission for
the railroads to lay and operate tracks, the railroads were not authorized to grant Sprint
and WilTel permission to lay cables. Similar suits have been filed around the country, with
the Connecticut case the 35th statewide deal receiving final approval. Although Sprint has
been utilizing this practice since the 1980s [8], the legal precedent now set by these cases
could complicate placing FOC alongside transportation infrastructure in the future because
telecommunications providers will have to obtain separate easements from landholders.
2.2.3 Traffic Consolidation
Studies of long-haul conduits frequently determine that conduit sharing between ISPs is a
default practice. One study [6] “observed that 89.67%, 63.28%, and 53.50% of the conduits
are shared by at least two, three, and four major ISPs, respectively.” The same study found
even more extreme examples, such as the conduit between Portland, OR and Seattle, WA
that housed traffic from 31 separate ISPs. Traffic switching nodes also represent a point of
traffic consolidation.
Traffic consolidation also takes place on the individual conduit level via several mech-
anisms. A single FOC cable contains many individual fibers, each capable of carrying
traffic independent of the others. Due to the high cost of installing new cables, providers
can simultaneously place more traffic on a single fiber through Wavelength-Division Mul-
tiplexing (WDM). WDM is analogous to Frequency-Division Multiplexing (FDM) due
to the inverse proportionality of wavelength and frequency in electromagnetic radiation,
however by convention WDM is normally used in reference to infrared frequency signals
in optical media such as FOC, while FDM is used for radio frequency signals. By mod-
ulating separate data channels onto different carrier wavelength signals for transmission,
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WDM permits an FOC operator to send multiple messages simultaneously over the same
fiber. Upon reaching their destination, the signals are separated via bandpass filtering and
their messages extracted. Dense Wavelength-Division Multiplexing (DWDM), a subset of
WDM, theoretically permits placing up to 100 10GB/s channels over optical media [9].
With each channel able to carry traffic from different senders running different network-
ing protocols, WDM can consolidate substantial portions of traffic into the same physical
conduits.
Another mechanism to move more traffic through the same physical location is “dark fiber.”
Because the high cost of installing FOC primarily lies in excavation, companies will fre-
quently install more than necessary in an given conduit with the knowledge that a certain
percentage of fibers will go unused for a time. Business transactions such as mergers
and acquisitions among telecommunications companies can also leave providers with extra
FOC running through the same conduit as live cables. These are commonly referred to
as dark fiber, and can be leased to customers who desire a greater degree of control over
their networks. Where WDM technologies can offer increase capabilities as a service, dark
fiber operates as a physical asset. Leasing dark fiber gives a customer permission to oper-
ate these unused fibers as their own, with a wide degree of freedom in customizing their
configuration.
2.2.4 Federal Initiatives
To encourage expansion and competition between broadband providers, President Obama
signed Executive Order 13616 [10]: “Accelerating Broadband Infrastructure Deployment.”
The executive order provides funding and direction for government agencies to coordinate
in order to streamline regulatory processes and reduce barriers experienced by broadband
providers seeking to expand. The Executive Order covered a variety of areas, most notably
initiatives known as “Dig-Once” practices [11]. When new broadband infrastructure (usu-
ally FOC) is laid underground in urban areas, up to 90% of installation costs are associated
with the actual road excavation. This can create prohibitive expenses for ISPs seeking to
expand into new areas, and also prevent new ISPs from entering markets in areas already
covered by a single provider, depriving consumers of beneficial competition.
Dig-Once initiatives preemptively lay FOC conduits at the same time that new transporta-
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tion infrastructure such as roads are put in. This permits ISPs to expand by running cables
through existing conduits, avoiding the high expense of excavating from scratch. Proposals
such as HR3805: The Broadband Conduit Deployment Act of 2015 [12] would mandate
FOC conduits on federally-funded highway construction projects if the area in question
is predicted to require broadband infrastructure within the next 15 years [13]. Although
HR3805 has not been passed at this time, efforts initiated by EO 13616 are actively de-
veloping Dig-Once practices through other channels. As Dig-Once laws are more widely
adopted, a side-effect will be further consolidation of traffic from multiple providers into
the same channels.
In addition to Dig-Once practices, the Broadband Opportunity Council (BOC) established
by EO 13616 made other recommendations that will shape the future growth of long-haul
networks. The BOC’s official report [14] pursuant to EO 13616 laid out several objectives,
including:
• Make Federal lands and assets available for conduits.
• Standardize permitting and regulation, shifting it to the federal level to reduce bur-
dens on local government and provide uniformity across state, local, and tribal
boundaries.
• Emphasize broadband as an eligible and desirable funding target for community and
regional infrastructure development projects.
• Collaborate with the private sector to reduce barriers to market entry and incumbent
expansion for broadband providers.
Because federal efforts related to EO 13616 are still in their preliminary stages as of early
2016, most details regarding how government and commercial industry plan to implement
and manage Dig-Once and related policies are not yet resolved. Timelines laid out by the
BOC aim to resolve most details and begin implementing practices by the end of 2016.
Regardless of their eventual form, federal efforts in this domain will only serve to increase
the complexity of the national networking landscape, accelerating the need for improved
understanding of both long-haul and lower level topologies.
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2.2.5 Resiliency
The driving force for improved understanding of physical networks from a national secu-
rity perspective centers around resiliency. With the increased dependency of vital services
such as the financial, medical, energy, and transportation industries on network connectiv-
ity, disruptions have potentially disastrous ramifications. Over a sufficiently large period
of time, a certain number of localized disruptions from man made or natural sources is
inevitable. This forces government overseers and commercial providers to avoid working
toward a perfect design in favor of one that can sustain damage and dynamically adapt to
minimize downtime.
While traffic consolidation is an effective business strategy for scaling up network capa-
bilities while maximizing profit, it comes at a price. When network traffic is constrained
to a limited number of physical locations, infrastructure disruptions can produce greater
outages than a more decentralized topology. During research for his book on the physical
Internet, author Andrew Blum [15] visited a number of these locations, remarking at one
that:
This [room] was the main access point for Milwaukee’s municipal data
network, connecting libraries, schools, and government offices. Without it,
thousands of civil servants would bang their computer mice against the desk
in frustration. All this talk about Homeland Security, but look what someone
could do in here with a chainsaw.
Damage to vital network infrastructure does not just come from malicious actors. In 2001,
a CSX freight train derailed in Baltimore’s Howard Street tunnel [16], causing a massive
fire that burned for hours despite extensive efforts by emergency response personnel. In
addition to causing property damage, the crash and subsequent fire severed a FOC con-
duit carrying Internet traffic from several providers as well as a large telephone FOC line.
Although Internet access was largely unaffected in many Washington, DC areas, traffic be-
tween DC and west coast locations such as San Diego slowed by up to a factor of 10 in
some locations. In order to restore redundancy, a team of telecommunications workers and
city officials had to excavate the street in four locations to clear blockages and route 24,000
feet of FOC through manhole accessible conduits over 36 hours.
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Natural disasters also pose a threat to networks that lack resiliency and redundancy. A
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) independent review panel [17] of Hurricane
Katrina’s effects on communications networks identified line cuts and a lack of redundant
pathways as two causative factors in the substantial outages accompanying the storm. One
example from their findings was a long-haul FOC conduit with a tandem switch inside New
Orleans and paths out of the city to the east and west. After the eastern route was cut by a
barge blown ashore, the western route was cut first by falling trees, and later by construction
crews removing debris from a highway ROW. Damage to a small number of switches in
New Orleans impacted traffic both inside the city and on conduits linking regions of the
country. Accidental fiber line cuts by clean-up and response teams were so prevalent that
BellSouth reported major routes cut in multiple places, and Cox Communications estimated
that 11 days after the storm it had suffered more network outages due to human damage
than the storm itself.
2.3 Physical Topology Mapping History
While many details remain unanswered, physical topology mapping research is not without
its past efforts. Since the early 2000s, many research groups and private companies have
attempted to make progress, with substantial but still limited successes. Most research ini-
tiatives in this area fall into one of two categories. Measurement-based projects attempt to
directly calculate results, normally by sending probes to certain destinations and timing the
responses while trying to compensate for errors induced by propagation, queuing, and vir-
tualization. Compilation-based projects rely on seeking out preexisting data from different
sources that independently offer little insight, but by gathering them together and analyzing
them, yield new results.
Many research projects addressing physical topology mapping are not fully applicable to
the problems projects such as net.Tagger seek to address. Most work focuses on IP geolo-
cation, which seeks to identify the rough geographical position of individual IP addresses
or IP subnets. IP geolocation has many commercial applications including targeted web
advertisements, fraud protection, and determining the applicability of interstate or inter-
national laws [18]. However, conventional IP geolocation suffers from two shortcomings
regarding physical topology mapping. First, the level of accuracy is normally too low.
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Even commercial geolocation services are usually limited to placing IP addresses within
a given zip code or greater, which is insufficient for constructing fine-grained maps [19].
Second, much of the desirable infrastructure targeted by researchers for mapping exists
below the IP layer [6]. The physical infrastructure sought by this project and other similar
ones cannot be completed by simply identifying the probable locations of router or higher
level architecture.
2.3.1 Measurement Based
One approach to network topology mapping that has been studied and expanded upon for
years uses a variety of probes and timing measurements to roughly geolocate individual
IP addresses and small subnets. These methods employ a number of “vantage points,”
consisting of servers (such as PlanetLab nodes) at precisely recorded coordinates to send
probes to target hosts. The propagation delay of FOCs is relatively fixed at 2/3c, which
increases to 4/9c when factoring in transmission, processing, and queuing delays.
The most basic implementation of timing-based geolocation was used by early implemen-
tations such as GeoPing, which made the observation that if the Round Trip Time (RTT)
between two known hosts was similar to the RTT of one of the known hosts and an un-
known target host, there was a tendency for the two to be geographically clustered [20].
These techniques relied on a large number of assumptions that their authors readily admit-
ted, but they represented some of the first efforts into IP Geolocation in the early 2000’s.
Accuracy with this basic implementation was limited, with GeoPing requiring 7–9 probe
sources to achieve an accuracy in the 100’s of km.
Fortunately, the past 10–15 years has seen a number of improvements. One of the most
important was the publication of CBG in 2004 [21]. Unlike earlier methods that could only
produce a discrete number of possible positions equal to the number of reference hosts,
CBG is capable of using multilateration to place a target host in a probable region that may
not include any of the reference hosts. Despite representing a substantial improvement with
room for growth, CBG is effectively limited to a median accuracy of 228 KM. Combining
CBG with high-level knowledge of ISP topology gained through other sources resulted in
the creation of Topology Based Geolocation (TBG), with an improved median accuracy of
67 km [22]. Further augmentation with knowledge of router locations and demographics
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data permits tools such as the Octant framework to achieve a median accuracy of 35.2
km [23]. While research continues to improve IP geolocation to the point that it may be
used for limited topology discovery [24], it still suffers from the shortcoming of targeting
too high a level of the Internet too inaccurately to produce the fine-grained, low-level maps
that would prove most beneficial to researchers.
Another IP-level geolocation method that augments timing-based approaches is DRoP.
DRoP takes advantage of common naming trends within the Domain Name System (DNS)
protocol, which maps human readable domain names to network addresses. Although no
official standard naming convention exists for DNS, the hostnames of router interfaces can
include descriptive keywords selected by the infrastructure’s owner to assist the organiza-
tion and administration of their assets. Frequently, at least some of this information will
include geographical hints about a location holding the physical infrastructure pointed to
by a DNS entry. Most are fine-grained to the city level. Common examples include
• IATA/ICAO codes identifying the largest airport in a city.
• CLLI position codes carrying varying levels of geographic resolution, normally trun-
cated to city/state for domain names.
• UN/LOCODE, identifying specific locations of locations relevant to the shipping and
manufacturing industry. Developed for European commerce.
• City names or abbreviations.
However, utilizing hostname hints for geolocation is far from straightforward. Many host-
names contain multiple pieces of information that could be interpreted as data with no
way to determine if the hostname owner chose any to describe the item’s location. An
example given by Center for Applied Internet Data Analysis (CAIDA) is the hostname
ccr.par01.atlas.cogentco.com, which potentially contains a Connecticut airport code (ccr),
a reference to Paris (indeterminate country), or a possible reference to Salas Atlas in Spain.
All hints point to different locations, and the hostname alone does not give sufficient back-
ground on the holder’s naming convention to say if any is correct. Despite these ambigui-
ties, DRoP hostname data can still provide useful insights. One approach is to group hints
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based on their domain level (inferring possible similarities in naming schemes) and then
check possible guesses against timing-based measurements to enact constraints based on
latency data. Combining timing measurements with DNS hostname has the potential to
provide accuracy down to the level provided by the hostname hint (usually the city con-
taining the interface), however DRoP is ineffective if an interface lacks a Fully Qualified
Domain Name (FQDN) or if nothing in the hostname matches a known hint. Previous work
places the number of router interfaces that cannot be classified with DRoP at approximately
45%.
Combining measurement and compilation methods can infer additional relationships be-
yond geolocating individual network nodes. Giotsas et al. demonstrate a method for map-
ping AS peering connections to facilities that makes use of several geolocation methods.
They begin by manually compiling a database of facilities such as IXPs and the networks
present at them. This information can be gathered primarily through self-reported data
published by the facilities to advertise the networks they support to peer with.
2.3.2 Compilation Based
Another approach to physical topology mapping relies on gathering data from existing
sources. Even though central repositories of topology data are not readily available, focused
subsets do exist. One source of data are the maps published by Tier-1 ISPs themselves. ISPs
frequently distribute rough maps of their central FOC graphs as commercial promotions to
demonstrate to potential clients the scope of their coverage. These maps provide a general
survey of their routes, but they frequently omit router-level detail, as ISPs consider such
information proprietary. Researchers who utilize them also observe that these maps are
sometimes optimistic, over-simplified, or out of date.
Tier-1 ISP maps are still of use to researchers as a starting point. Some projects have
successfully started with ISP maps and fleshed out smaller details through clever use of
other data sources [6]. A 2015 project [6] combined ISP maps with geocodings from
the Internet Atlas Project [2] to create a base map. The researchers then exhaustively
gathered public domain information such as government/municipality records, commercial
entity documentation, utility ROW, environmental impact statements, and fiber sharing
arrangements from states’ Departments of Transportation (DOTs). Through extrapolation
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and cross-correlation, the team was able to produce a number of conclusions about the
state of long-haul FOC infrastructure and the sharing agreements implemented by ISPs on
the physical level. Provided the underlying documentation and extrapolation assumptions
are correct, mapping efforts like these provide a valuable counterpart to the error-prone
measurement based techniques. However, the quantity and variety of documentation used
for these projects makes validating their accuracy infeasible. They also tend to focus on
larger Internet backbone infrastructure because their methods and the documentation they
rely on do not accurately scale down to more fine-grained levels.
Another area of compilation-based network mapping with a much more established history
is that of submarine communications cables. A successor to submarine telegraph and tele-
phone cables, modern submarine FOC cables carry the majority of transcontinental Internet
traffic. Because of their crucial role in connecting countries to the global Internet backbone,
submarine cables are considered by many governments as vital national assets. However,
submarine cables are frequently subject to damage due to natural phenomena such as ocean
current and earthquakes or manmade sources such as anchors, trawling nets, or intentional
sabotage. Their importance, vulnerability, and relatively low numbers make submarine ca-
bles a sought-after mapping target by telecommunications research firms who sell maps
and data to a variety of customers. Various free sources exist such as TeleGeography’s
interactive online Submarine Cable Map [25]. However, most free maps are deliberately
designed with a low level of detail. TeleGeography’s free product is “stylized to improve
readability” and “does not reflect the physical cable location.” Its cable landing stations are
also “not precise coordinates” and “are meant to serve as a general guide.” More descriptive
maps and datasets are available from these sources but come with expensive subscription
fees and licensing restrictions on use.
2.4 Crowdsourced Mapping
Much of the initial inspiration for net.Tagger came from the success of crowdsourced map-
ping projects, the most notable of which is the OSM project [26]. OSM is a worldwide
initiative with its origins in Europe, officially supported but not managed by the OSM
Foundation. Its goal is to provide a freely available, open source collection of GIS data.
Often described as the “Wikipedia of Google Maps,” OSM has over 2.4 million registered
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users [27] submitting data. OSM users gather data through different means and submit
their findings to OSM using one of many available web, desktop, or mobile editor ap-
plications [28]. Most of the editors are created through community projects with OSM’s
publicly available editing Application Programming Interface (API) and provide experi-
ences designed for subsets of the user base. Although many different options exist for
users to interact with the OSM data set, the three most popular editors are iD, Potlatch2,
and JOSM. iD and Potlatch2 are both browser based editors available directly from the
main OSM website’s planet map. They permit users to tag and edit as they interact with
a map populated from the entire OSM dataset. Potlatch2 is an older editor that requires
flash browser support, however it offers more features than iD and is still widely used. iD
is javascript based and is designed for more novice users, with an emphasis on simplic-
ity. JOSM is a standalone desktop application designed for experienced users, providing
customizability through plugins and a broader feature set at the price of a steeper learning
curve. JOSM allows users to input large data sets offline, automatically validate for com-
mon errors, and then push edits to the OSM dataset when finished. Although these three
editors are the most common among the OSM community, many other open source editing
applications exist that make use of OSM’s editing API. OSM’s editor documentation [28]
currently lists seven editors apiece for android and IOS devices. The smartphone editors
vary in capability and intent. Some are designed for other Geographical Information Sys-
tem (GIS) purposes and offer limited ability to push edits to OSM, while others are fully
feature editors capable of submitting all types of OSM objects from field locations. Af-
ter OSM received permission to overlay satellite images from sources such as Bing Maps
over its existing tiles, users became able to visually identify and trace out features on these
applications without needing to conduct field surveys.
Because OSM relies on the assumption that users will vet data before submitting, most of
their data error come from inadvertant user mistakes or intentionally placed copyright easter
eggs [29]. The official OSM wiki [30] addresses this issue by noting that even proprietary
data sources have errors including intentional “copyright easter eggs.” It also discusses the
“wikipedia-style model” the project follows, where each user can add history/submission
metadata to their profile’s uploads. OSM claims that because most users are deliberate in
their methods and non-malicious, the collection of correct data points is substantially larger
than the few incorrect ones, and overlap between user submissions will quickly identify and
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correct small errors.
Formal analysis of OSM data shows that these claims are reasonably correct, with several
caveats. One study [31] compared formal geographical survey data against data from OSM
and Tele Atlas, a commercial GIS supplier to many projects including early version of
Google Maps. Analysis found that both OSM and Tele Atlas deviated from the survey data
with similar spacial deviations. However, OSM showed greater inaccuracies in rural areas,
where the study deduced that there were fewer users than urban areas where the OSM error
rate was comparatively lower. Another study [32] found that the majority of high qual-
ity OSM submissions came from a core group of “Expert” to “Professional” level users
comprising only 3–4% of the OSM user base, with an accuracy approaching or at the level
of commercial agencies. The lowest levels of participation and submission quality came
from the approximately 74% of “Beginner” users. In addition to user-submitted findings,
OSM utilizes imports from many other open GIS repositories [33] with the permission of
the owner, providing a foundation of data from a multitude of sources, many of which
were professionally gathered. The OSM dataset is used by private citizens, companies, and
government agencies for web, desktop, and mobile applications. Proprietary GIS datasets
potentially come with licensing fees, Terms of Service (TOS) agreements, and privacy poli-
cies that are incompatible with the fiscal resources or ideological viewpoints of application
developers or their userbase. Because of its open source philosophy, OSM is free to use
and under the Open Data Commons Open Database License, has a very liberal use policy
that only requires attribution to the OSM project. By contrast, most Google Maps API de-
veloper tiers permit small-scale usage for free but begin charging an owner once registered
applications using their API key exceed 25,000 queries per day. Although Google offers
Quality of Service (QoS) guarantees and additional support with its higher priced tiers,
many small open-sourced projects requiring a GIS dataset are minimally funded and utilize
the expertise of its user base for technical support. For them, relying on proprietary systems
is infeasible, and OSM data combined with free GIS software libraries allows them to de-
velop at minimal cost. As a result, small independent developers have produced a plethora
of OSM reliant applications from smartphone navigation apps to online search engines for
National Park campsites. OSM is also utilized by government and Non-Government Or-
ganizations (NGOs) for crisis mapping. After the 2010 Haiti earthquake decimated large
swaths of the country, rescue teams were hindered by the lack of accurate, up-to-date maps.
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OSM volunteers began recording roads based on available Yahoo imagery. Other volunteer
teams deployed to Haiti itself to begin mapping with OSM techniques. The end result was
a highly detailed GIS resource that quickly became the default map for all NGOs in the
area as well as other responding organizations such as the United Nations and the World
Bank [34].
Crowdsourcing has also been applied to networking projects with success. The Portolan
project [35], a collaboration between Italian research entities including the University of
Pisa, is one such example. Portolan employs a distributed smartphone app framework
similar to the one proposed by us for net.Tagger. It seeks to build maps of mobile device
signal coverage and AS-level connections by collecting a combination of passive and active
measurements from smartphone sensors. The Portolan app utilizes geolocation measure-
ments from other onboard phone applications to minimize battery use, correlating them
with time-synchronized measurements of phone signal strength [36]. The app also per-
forms traceroutes to target locations after receiving periodic instructions from a central
command and control server that also collects and stores data. Portolan’s creators identi-
fied a streamlined and minimal user experience, low smartphone resource footprint, and
providing users with access to a partial results dataset as their main design goals to encour-
age user participation [37]. They selected Android as their initial deployment platform,
citing an overall ease of development and distribution that outweighed the difficulties in
implementing networking algorithms such as Paris Traceroute. Preliminary analysis of
Portolan research results showed consistency against a CAIDA traceroute dataset and even
several cases where traceroutes from smartphones employing the app traversed routes in
the opposite direction as the CAIDA traces, uncovering new router interfaces. Although
Portolan is still in its infancy relative to its developers’ eventual objectives, it demonstrates
the utility of performing crowdsourced, smartphone-based network measurements.
2.5 Infrastructure Indicators
net.Tagger’s basic approach to physical topology mapping relies on a user’s ability to iden-
tify street-level indicators of telecommunications infrastructure. This presents two chal-
lenges: First, users may not have previous experience in spotting infrastructure, and sec-
ond, most infrastructure is hidden from view and can be identified only through indirect
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indicators. Most indicators available to common observers signal the presence of FOC.
Exceptions exist, but most sensitive equipment such as routers or server racks are secured
on private property owned by ISPs. However, the connections between these entities often
pass through public space, and must have some means for their owners to access them to
perform maintenance. They also must be marked clearly enough that other contractors or
utility providers do not inadvertently damage them during construction or operations. Pub-
licly available information on telecommunications markings is limited, but a combination
of public utilities publications and field research performed for this project has revealed the
following targets of interest for net.Tagger.
2.5.1 Orange Markings
One of the most prevalent and reliable street-level indicators of telecommunications equip-
ment relies on the public utility color-coded system. The system is maintained and pro-
moted by the American Public Works Association, a non-profit professional organization
including both public works agencies and private sector companies who work in the field.
The American Public Works Association (APWA) Uniform Color Code [38], laid out in
ANSI standard Z535.1: Safety Colors for Temporary Marking and Facility Identification
(see Figure 2.1), is not absolutely binding but is followed by most agencies throughout the
country for conformity reasons. The purpose of the APWA Uniform Color Code is to stan-
dardize the markings public utility agencies and companies use to identify and warn each
other of the presence of underground infrastructure based on type.
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Figure 2.1: Street Markings Color Code. Source: [39]
The most relevant color entry for net.Tagger’s work is orange, specifically color shade PMS
144. Bright orange markings laid in paint or chalk on roads, sidewalks, or other public
spaces in the United States are usually a sign that telecommunications equipment is present
below ground. This can include phone lines, cable TV, or fiber-optic cables. The markings
vary greatly in style depending on the project, but will frequently be drawn with lines or
arrows indicating the direction of travel of the cables. Many have amplifying information
including the ISP who owns the equipment and what their particular use is. Figure 2.2 and
Figure 2.3 show examples.
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Figure 2.2: Orange Marking Figure 2.3: Orange Marking
Even though phone and cable TV lines are not of primary interest to the net.Tagger project,
multiple types of cables are often run together to economize on space, thus any orange
markings are a desired find. Even better are markings carrying the initials “FOC,” indicat-
ing fiber-optic cables. If a marking specifically states fiber-optic, there is a higher proba-
bility it carries network traffic instead of other services. Assigning this higher certainty to
a find creates a more useful data point for later topology extrapolation.
One other street marking color of lesser significance to net.Tagger is white, indicating “pro-
posed excavation.” Because white does not specify if the excavation is for telecommunica-
tions work or other purposes, white markings alone are useless for net.Tagger. However, the
field research conducted for this project frequently found white markings that were covered
over by orange, suggesting that excavation occurred and telecommunications equipment or
cabling was installed. This can provide a potentially useful data point regarding the recency
of the find. It is important to note that these criteria do not apply outside of the U.S., where
different color codes are used. For example, in the UK, telecommunications equipment is
identified with the color green, which in the U.S. indicates sewers and stormwater systems.
2.5.2 Duct Markings
Orange street markings come in a variety of shapes depending on their intended use. One
subset of orange markings is of special significance because they indicate a duct carrying a
bundle of telecommunications cables. Duct markings also have several forms they can take,
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but most consist of several parallel lines or parallel lines boxing in a diamond as shown in
Figure 2.4 and Figure 2.5.
Figure 2.4: Duct Marking Figure 2.5: Annotated Duct
Marking
Frequently duct markings will be annotated with the width of the duct (such as “24 inch
FOC duct”). The personnel laying down duct markings will usually string together sev-
eral markings in a line, indicating the exact location of the communications channel. Duct
markings have the benefit of identifying a greater than usual concentration of telecommu-
nications infrastructure as well as exactly where it leads to, giving valuable information to
prospective mappers.
2.5.3 Manhole Covers
Accompanying temporary paint or chalk markings are more permanent infrastructure indi-
cators that serve as access points to equipment for maintenance personnel. The largest and
most prominent examples are manhole covers. Although many manhole covers in an urban
area provide sewer access, others are devoted to accessing telecommunications equipment.
Unlike sewer accesses which are marked with “Sewer” or “S,” telecommunications man-
holes will bear the name of the provider who operates their underlying equipment. Most
will also bear a unique, distinguishable honeycomb pattern visible in Figure 2.6 and Fig-
ure 2.7, but other categories of manhole covers (such as those used for accessing power
equipment) might also have this pattern. In addition to the middle of streets, telecommuni-
cations manholes can be found on sidewalks and in the middle of traffic intersections next
to sewer accesses.
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Figure 2.6: Bell System Figure 2.7: US West
Manhole covers do not provide as detailed information as other sources, but they still iden-
tify the presence of telecommunications infrastructure at a location. The operator name
that they provide is also useful data, however the markings do not necessarily reflect the
current owner if the original owning company was bought or sold.
2.5.4 Handholes
A less prominent, but often more descriptive maintenance access point, is the handhole.
A smaller cousin to manholes, handholes are usually found on sidewalks and are much
smaller, only providing enough room for a technician to reach inside instead of enter
entirely. Similar to manholes, handholes might be used for different equipment such as
power or water meters. Telecommunications handholes can be marked with the name of
their equipment owner, but often bear descriptive names as well (Figure 2.8and Figure 2.9).




Figure 2.9: Computer Handhole
Others are even larger, approaching the size of manhole covers and bearing additional in-
formation such as the ratings of the equipment they protect. Figure 2.10 and Figure 2.11
both demonstrate equipment ratings labels.
Figure 2.10: Fiber Optic
15/20K
Figure 2.11: SBC NewBasis
20K
Handholes provide similar information as manhole covers, with the occasional bonus of
amplifying information.
2.5.5 Dig Warnings
The infrastructure indicator that most non-technical persons are familiar with are “Call
Before You Dig” signs erected to warn landscapers, homeowners, and contractors about the
presence of buried hazards such as gas lines. Telecommunication dig signs can frequently
be found along roads and are usually small green or gray columns with an orange sign
stating “Warning: Underground Cable. Dig Safely” and giving the name of the provider
managing the cable. Figure 2.12 and Figure 2.13 show different dig warnings on similar
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columns.
Figure 2.12: Qwest Warning Figure 2.13: Century Link
Warning (Close-Up)
Although dig warnings might seem to provide a limited amount of information, they some-
times permit helpful data extrapolation. Because FOCs usually (but not always) follow
roads, a string of dig warnings along the same section of main road labeled with the same
provider name is a strong indicator of the direction the cable lies in.
2.5.6 Cell Towers
Some cell towers are easily identified by by signage placed on surrounding fencing that lists
operator names and the tower’s FCC identification number. Figure 2.14 shows a standard
cell tower base with its accompanying labelling.
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Figure 2.14: Cell Tower Markings
Others are deliberately concealed to blend in with local landscapes and features. In Fig-
ure 2.15, a cell tower has been disguised as a tree, although its distinctive base is still
visible.
Figure 2.15: Hidden Cell Tower. Source: [40]
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This practice allows providers to place infrastructure in close proximity to urban areas,
however local residents sometimes file lawsuits over supposed health effects [41]. Online
communities [42] exist devoted to cataloging examples of cell towers in a variety of dis-
guises ranging from cacti to church steeples. While some are fully concealed, others are
still surrounded with standard fencing and FCC markings that can be easily identified by
a nearby observer. Even though the cell tower in Figure 2.15 is disguised as a tree, its
distinctive base is still visible. Figure 2.14 shows a different tower that is not concealed,
demonstrating the full range of labels that might appear. Cell towers are useful in mapping
because they are frequently connected to sizable ground FOC lines. Searching the roads
and trails surrounding a cell tower usually leads to discovery of other infrastructure indi-
cators in the immediate vicinity. Cell towers represent a useful location to begin a fresh
search for infrastructure and can be good jumping off points for further investigation.
2.5.7 Buildings
Buildings holding actual infrastructure equipment such as servers, routers, or data storage
are difficult to identify because they are usually well-secured on private property and un-
marked. In the event that following FOC trails leads to identifiable ISP properties, a very
useful mapping association is made. net.Tagger allows users to submit building findings in
the event that a possible building is identified due to the potential value of the find.
2.6 Android Platform Capabilities
The net.Tagger concept relies on a distributed network of smartphones that can individu-
ally collect and submit research data. We utilize Android for our initial development and
release. In addition to comments and other data that users can enter manually, the platform
provides the following capabilities.
2.6.1 Location Data
Android currently offers two location APIs. The first is the stock Android.Location API
[43], which is still supported, but in the process of being phased out. Google recommends
developers utilize the newer Google Play Location Services API [44], which requires reg-
istration with the Play Store but offers better performance, accuracy, and battery usage.
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Either API can be interfaced with the Google Maps API, which requires additional regis-
tration but permits an app to directly display location overlays. Developers can configure
“Location Listeners” at runtime that dictate how frequently and precisely the app performs
location updates, trading accuracy for battery usage.
2.6.2 Sensors
So long as its underlying hardware supports all sensors, an Android smartphone app can
collect raw data from many types of sensors [45]. Not all devices will contain all possible
sensors, and some devices may contain multiple instances of the same sensor that have
different levels of precision. The Android sensor management packages provide tools for
an app to determine which sensors exist on a device, what capabilities those sensors have,
and how to register and read from the sensors. Examples of Android sensors [45] include:
Motion Sensors
Gyroscopic, accelerometer, and rotational vector sensors that can measure rotation and
translation in all three spatial dimensions.
Environmental Sensors
Barometers, thermometers, and photometers that can measure humidity, atmospheric pres-
sure, temperature, and illumination.
Position Sensors
Orientation sensors and magnetometers that measure the physical position of a device.
2.6.3 Camera
Although the Android Camera API permits fine-grained control of any onboard cameras,
it also provides built-in tools to use basic camera features with minimal effort. Android
documentation recommends that developers determine the role that image collection plays
in their project and utilize these pre-existing tools unless their app requires a custom camera
configuration. The Camera API permits developers to integrate the stock camera UI that
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all users are familiar with into their apps, which reduces the possibility of user error or
stability issues accidentally introduced by developers.
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The core goal of the net.Tagger project is to obtain GIS data and descriptions of street-
level network infrastructure indicators in sufficient quantity and detail to infer accurate in-
sights about underlying network topology. net.Tagger will pursue this goal via a distributed
crowdsourcing approach that is easy and fulfilling for the project’s user base. Crowdsourc-
ing will be implemented via a mobile app. For our purposes, we consider an app as a
program running directly on a mobile device’s operating system [46]. This is in contrast to
software running on a dedicated computer or through a web browser. Core project require-
ments (in no particular order) are:
• The overall app experience should be as streamlined as possible to minimize user
frustrations, reduce the app’s learning curve, and increase the likelihood of a user’s
continued involvement in the project. Most users who seek to become involved
will possess some networking knowledge, however their initial unfamiliarity with
net.Tagger and the project’s target data must be overcome to produce productive
users. A straightforward user experience will lower barriers to entry and reduce op-
portunities for a user to execute the submission process incorrectly. Similar to OSM’s
crowdsourcing process, our project model contains a possibility that users will mis-
interpret findings or improperly perform submissions. A simply, streamlined user
experience introduces fewer opportunities to perform an erroneous action. Overall,
the app should be able to move a user from identifying a finding to submitting a
data point in the fewest number of interactions (such as clicking or entering text) as
possible.
• The app must send enough data on a tag submission to provide a useful data point. If
the ultimate goal of net.Tagger is to infer meaningful and accurate network topology
data, certain key pieces of information are necessary for each submission. At a mini-
mum, a “tag” is a single transaction sending Geographical Positioning System (GPS)
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coordinates, the GPS accuracy at time of submission, a timestamp, and the user’s
belief about the infrastructure’s type and provider. The user must also be encouraged
to submit images and any miscellaneous observations, providing extra resources for
net.Tagger researchers to verify submission accuracy and make network inferences.
• The app must provide users with text or graphical feedback immediately after sub-
mitting a finding. The feedback will ensure that users see that their action completed,
keeping them invested.
• The app experience must provide users with incentives to continue participating. A
multifaceted approach should be employed to reach users with different motivations.
These can include community prestige through an online leaderboard, small mone-
tary rewards, or providing access to a portion of the dataset in exchange for partici-
pating. These incentives should be tailored to improve the quality of research data,
such as providing additional rewards for validating existing tags from other users
instead of just submitting original tags.
• The app must operate reliably, handling errors properly, and avoid crashes. Stability
issues are likely to induce frustration in users, leading to reduced participation or
quitting the project altogether.
• The app must balance user privacy, data security, and overall usability. The app
should maintain a unique profile for each user used to identify and authenticate their
data submissions, but limit required user information to that necessary for research
purposes. No information should be collected without the user’s knowledge and
consent.
• Data submitted by users must be protected during submission (“in transit”) and in
storage (“at rest”). Data must be secured in transit against an adversary capable of
intercepting cellular signals or sniffing network traffic. Data should be stored on
servers we control, and in a manner that is resistant against web and database attacks
(such as SQL injection). No services or databases should be not be exposed beyond
what is necessary for approved client/server operations and additional access must
require administrator credentials. secure.
• Data should be logically ordered in order to facilitate indexing, retrieval, and inter-
facing with standard GIS tools such as the OSM software stack. This does not affect
the data collection process, but is required for the eventual data analysis that is the
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core goal of net.Tagger. Because the eventual dataset will be very large, it must be
stored in a format that can be efficiently queried based on parameters and constraints
via native PostGIS functionality, scripts, and GIS software.
• At a minimum, users should be able to view their own tag history directly from the
app. Ideally, users should also be able to view the entire set of tags both from the app
and online if resources permit.
net.Tagger’s design requirements were chosen to support two approaches to user data col-
lection. As the OSM project demonstrates [32], the most accurate and complete data will
likely be submitted by a small, core section of users. This group will likely possess greater
than average technical knowledge and a willingness to devote blocks of time and effort
specifically to collecting data. These users will be interested in submitting findings that are
not only accurate, but also as complete and informative as possible. If the app offers extra
functionality, they are likely to learn and use it properly. They will also be concerned with
their search coverage, canvassing as large an area as possible without missing or repeating
sections.
Similar statistics on OSM users shows that a larger proportion of users will contribute less
frequently and with a higher chance of submitting incorrect or incomplete data. These users
will benefit from a simple experience that requires a minimal amount of time and number of
interactions to submit tags. Their submissions are likely to be made while conducting other
activities, making convenience and usability key to their continued participation. They do
not require complex features, as they are less likely to take the time to learn and use them
regularly.
Most users will not fall explicitly into one of these two groups, but will use a combination
of both methods depending on their lifestyle. A user might perform detailed, structured
data collection for several hours on a weekend but also submit findings as they come across
them during weekday activities. To capitalize on its user base, the app must cater to both
methods. The UI and user experience must be streamlined enough for quick and intuitive
submissions, while still allowing users to track their past submissions and provide addi-
tional details when they have the time and interest to do so.
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3.2 App Design
3.2.1 Initial App Design
During its original development, the net.Tagger app focused on function over form. As the
project evolved and received input from reviewers, several UI necessities became apparent.
Initial iterations of net.Tagger were structured as follows:
• The user began on a “main screen” (Figure 3.1) that linked to pages such as profile
data, data submission, instructions/examples, and a display of past submissions.
• After setting up a profile and viewing the training pages, the user spent most time on
the data submission page (Figure 3.2) to submit findings.
• To receive any feedback beyond a “Data Submitted” message, the user needed to take
several extra steps that brought them out of the submission cycle.
Figure 3.1: Initial Main Screen Figure 3.2: Initial Submit
Screen
The layout was not conducive to a positive user experience and was likely to foster disin-
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terest and frustration. The barebones prototype was adequate for initial development, but
did not meet all design requirements.
3.2.2 Refined App Design
• The main page (Figure 3.3) that the user “lives in” was changed to include the sub-
missions map. This ensured that the user constantly sees their previous tags and is
immediately shown the result of a tag submission as a new map marker. The user
can also watch their position marker move around the map filling in blank spaces
with fresh findings. This provides constant feedback without moving to a fresh app
screen.
• Tasks such as submitting data, modifying profiles, and viewing infrastructure indica-
tor examples are moved to pop-up activities that display off of the main app screen
(Figure 3.4). The user does not have to click through multiple screens to accomplish
basic tasks, reducing time away from the main screen. All interactions take place
from a single, central screen.
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Figure 3.3: Refined Main
Screen
Figure 3.4: Refined Submit
Screen
Figure 3.3 shows a user’s main screen after two hours of tagging in downtown Salinas, CA.
3.2.3 Platform Selection
Because crowdsourcing depends on reaching the largest possible user base, net.Tagger
would ideally be developed for multiple smartphone architectures. However, confining
the project to a single architecture for initial research phases facilitates testing non-app
components without the substantial workload brought on by deploying on different plat-
forms. A mature project can only be created through continual deployment and testing that
reveals issues needing resolution. This necessitates choosing a single smartphone architec-
ture for initial app development before porting to others. Early testing before wide scale
deployment does not rely on reaching a broad user base, placing a premium on platform
development ease instead of overall market share. After considering available options,
Android and IOS emerged as the most viable architectures for an initial net.Tagger app.
Android’s documentation, developer community, open source philosophy, and distribution
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system made it an ideal development platform. Although either option would have worked
well, easy integration with tools such as the Google Maps API and the Google Play Store
reduced many project requirements to previously solved problems. We leave expansion to
IOS as future work.
3.2.4 User Interface
The most important iteration in the evolution of the UI was bringing an emphasis on feed-
back to the forefront of the user experience. Early versions were successful in gathering
data during local field tests, however the testing was carried out by project members with
external motivation to continue submitting data. With this configuration, a normal user
without any explicit ties to the project would be expected to expend time walking around
urban areas entering data about their finds without receiving immediate feedback beyond
a “Data Submitted” app message. Most users would quickly grow disillusioned with this
configuration, feeling they were performing unpaid labor with little incentive to continue.
A successful crowdsourcing project depends upon users feeling invested in a common goal,
and the early app UI did not accomplish this.
Several different solutions to the user feedback problem were evaluated for feasibility ver-
sus payoff. For example, an approach requiring minimal effort would be to run scripts on
the net.Tagger Virtual Private Server (VPS) to let users download a Keyhole Markup Lan-
guage (KML) record of their submissions to view in Google Earth via a tablet or PC. This
basic solution permits the user to view submissions, but only after returning from gathering
data and completing several steps. We posit that a dedicated group of users might be will-
ing to perform these extra tasks to view the results of their efforts, but this might discourage
more casual users. It also violates our design requirements that emphasize a streamlined
process with immediate, automated user feedback.
Another prototyped solution kept a KML file on the user’s phone to record submissions
locally in addition to sending them to the net.Tagger backend server. After making a series
of captures from the “Data Submit” page, the user had the ability to return to the main page
and select a “View Submissions” option. This would launch Android’s Google Earth app
(assuming the user had it installed on their phone) and load the local KML file, displaying
the user’s submission history as a series of map markers overlaid on a global map. This
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approach provided the user with instant smartphone feedback identical to the previous op-
tion. The user no longer needed to download a file and could view their map in between
submissions, even while gathering data. However, this design had several drawbacks.
Due to the design of the Android OS, opening Google Earth and populating it with
net.Tagger data was a trivial task. However, if the user was already running Google Earth
in the background when they tried to view submissions in net.Tagger, no new data would
be loaded. As a stopgap, the app displayed a message to the user reminding them to close
instances of Google Earth before viewing tag submissions. Counting on a user to follow
extra task direction for a basic feature to work properly is inadvisable and risks frustrating
users. A good UI design should present immediate feedback within one to two seconds
every time a user performs a task, particularly a data submission. Although this design
was an improvement over the initial layout, it still required a user to submit tags from one
screen, navigate to the main page, leave the app to check the Task Manager, return to the
app, and select “View Submissions,” opening up an entirely separate app (Google Earth) to
finally display findings.
The final UI layout came about after gathering feedback from test users, some of whom
had prior app development experience. The most important design decision was changing
the workflow to shift the submission map from a secondary feature to the app’s primary
focus. All previous iterations of the app required the user to begin at a main page and
navigate between separate pages to submit and view findings. A streamlined design put
the submission map as the main page, with the user navigation to other pages through the
map screen. This was made possible through integration with the Google Maps API. By
utilizing an Android MapView as the background of the main page, the user’s default view
is now a map overlay that shows their position and instantly populates itself with markers
after each submission. An eventual development goal is to populate each user’s in-app
map with a rough representation of the entire net.Tagger dataset, showing them all covered
and uncovered regions. However, implementing this feature in the app’s initial release was
infeasible due to time constraints so a local map of the individual user’s finds was added
instead.
Another goal of the final UI was to minimize the time the user spent away from the map
screen, both in time and “apparent distance.” To achieve this, the other app activities (data
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submission, profile management, etc.) were changed from fully separate screens to pop-up
windows accessible from the map interface. The map becomes the only full screen activity
in the entire app and is visible in the background during other tasks. This results in a more
interactive interface, providing immediate and continual feedback. The new layout also
naturally encourages users to cover a wider area. Lacking an informative layout, users
might concentrate their search efforts in a single area or accidentally revisit locations. By
confronting the user with a constant reminder of how their submissions are grouped relative
to their current location, most users will naturally gravitate to new areas.
3.2.5 User Training
Crowdsourcing is a medium that produces reasonable reliable results when applied to tasks
that do not require specialized knowledge. Burnap et al. [47] applied crowdsourcing to en-
gineering design problems with objectively quantifiable answers to study the effectiveness
of crowdsourcing for scenarios requiring technical knowledge. They observed above aver-
age results when experts within the participant base were identified and their contributions
weighted more heavily. However, failing to do so negated most benefits of crowdsourc-
ing because clusters of consistently incorrect participants cancelled out contributions from
more knowledgeable persons. This suggests that raising the knowledge level of a user base
should be a priority for technical crowdsourcing projects. Since net.Tagger is available to
the general populace, excessively relying on a user to make technical decisions increases
the probability that they will submit incorrect results. Fortunately, net.Tagger users do
not need to understand most of the networking theory discussed in Chapter 2. As long as
users are able to identify the infrastructure indicators discussed in 2.5 and understand the
relevance of utility markings and infrastructure provider names, they will usually be able
to perform accurate assessments. To train users, the app has a “Training and Examples”
section (Figure 3.5) that lays out identifying information, sample images, and examples of
helpful user comments for each infrastructure indicator type.
39
Figure 3.5: Examples Screen
Additional means of validating submissions are a priority for future net.Tagger research.
While it is inevitable that some level of user misunderstanding will lead to erroneous sub-
missions, crowdsourcing possesses natural error correcting mechanisms. Because users
can only view their own previous submissions and not those of others, multiple users in-
vestigating the same area are likely to tag the same object. The set of submissions for a
single infrastructure indicator will have several that agree with each other, pointing toward
the correct data. Furthermore, even if the user is wrong about their submission, the combi-
nation of an image with its GPS coordinates will be enough for researchers to extract some
level of information. These redundancies reduce the level of training that most users will




Due to the simplicity of the net.Tagger app, most web architectures and frameworks could
be adapted to handle and store collected data. As for any project, the server side imple-
mentation must be reliable and secure. Finally, all components must provide appropriate
GIS capabilities where needed as well as the means to maintain compatibility with other
GIS projects such as OSM. Factors such as datum, map projection, coordinate systems,
and time zones must be accounted for to ensure that the collected dataset can be compared
to and combined with those from other sources. Currently, net.Tagger relies on technolo-
gies such as Google Maps for most of its GIS data collection and display. However, as
the project eventually moves to other platforms such as IOS, net.Tagger aims to shift to
open source, platform agnostic tools for tasks such as rendering. The selected architecture
should be easily migrated to other tools and platforms without requiring extensive redesign.
3.3.2 Database Selection
Most GIS projects utilize an SQL-type database to store data. net.Tagger was heavily in-
spired by OSM and is designed to maintain compatibility with it for future research efforts,
making OSM’s software choices relevant to this project. While OSM does not officially
endorse a specific software stack, the majority of its users, including the core OSM distri-
bution, relies on a popular GIS add-on to PostgreSQL known as PostGIS.
PostgreSQL (abbreviated as Postgres) is a powerful Object-Relational Database Manage-
ment System (ORDBMS) compliant with the SQL standards and provides many advanced
features. While Postgres supports basic geometric data types, it lacks support to handle
spatial data and transactions. Fortunately, Postgres is designed to be easily extensible. In
2001, the company Refractions Research released the first iteration of an add-on named
PostGIS to provide basic spatial types. PostGIS has continued developing new features
that not only aid data storage, but provide tools for querying and analyzing geospatial data.
These capabilities extend beyond those available with more conventional GIS storage types
that are limited in their ability to store accompanying metadata or large data quantities.
Most OSM users utilize PostGIS in conjunction with the OSM project’s custom GIS for-
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mats, particularly the OSM XML format and its variants. The OSM XML file format is a
human readable representation of OSM data. The OSM project hosts free copies of .osm
files for most countries and states online, including a master planet.osm file, containing all
collected data the project possesses. At the time of writing, planet.osm is approximately 50
GB of data compressed, expanding to over 500 GB uncompressed. Since plaintext XML is
not an efficient storage medium, binary and compressed representations of .osm files also
exist. For practical use, software packages such as the popular osm2pgsql library exist that
can receive .osm files as input and insert the bulk data into a PostGIS database. The find-
ings and metadata collected by net.Tagger are not best expressed in the table format used
by packages such as osm2pgsql, as these combine most metadata into a single “tags” col-
umn that does not permit querying the individual elements. Since most of the metadata for
net.Tagger such as infrastructure provider or infrastructure type must be able to be queried
directly, the format is not ideal for this project. Thus, net.Tagger finds middle ground by
using a PostGIS database that stores appropriate data in individual columns but keeps data
such as lat/long coordinates in the same format as OSM databases. The project database is
ideally suited for its specific research needs while retaining the ability to interact with other
data sources through existing GIS software.
3.3.3 Scripts
Server-side processing is performed through a series of PHP scripts. PHP was chosen due
its ease of deployment, preexisting code body, and user community. While PHP is consid-
ered by some to present security risks when deployed in large-scale, complex web appli-
cations, most reported PHP security flaws are not due to inherent technical flaws but poor
coding practices. To rectify this, many features exist to perform sensitive processes such
as password validation or database operations without requiring developers to manually
implement them and risk doing so improperly. Server operations in net.Tagger are lim-
ited, primarily restricted to user credential validation, receiving GIS data and photographs,
and performing database storage operations. All these operations are well-understood pro-
cesses with established best practices. Because net.Tagger does not have a web presence
with complicated user interaction needs, PHP is an appropriate option that fulfills the quick
development time the project requires.
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3.3.4 Security Considerations
net.Tagger was intentionally designed to limit the amount of sensitive data it transmits
and stores. This limits the security requirements of the project to following best practices
and using built-in features of its native software packages. All user submissions including
profile data, tag data, and images, are sent via https POST messages utilizing Android’s
built-in security certificates. User sessions are recorded and authenticated via session keys
in keeping with basic web application principles, and user passwords are stored in hashed
and salted form. Due to a plethora of incidents where PHP developers improperly designed
their own password handling procedures, PHP now automates the entire process within a
single function call to store or validate a password, removing room for error. Most impor-
tantly is the decision to limit user metadata. Users are identified via a valid email address
and their country of origin, limiting the cost of a potential security compromise. As a
crowdsourcing operation, net.Tagger only requires the ability to track users to the extent
needed for statistical metrics and the ability to recognize high contributors via leaderboard.
3.3.5 Scalability
A successful crowdsourcing operation depends by its very nature on the ability to offer its
services to a variable number of users. Depending on the size of its objective, the desirable
number of participants will usually be very large. OSM boasts a sizable user base, with
usage statistics [27] at the end of 2015 reporting over 2.5 million registered users, with
over 10,000 actively contributing data weekly and 60,000 monthly. Many of the most
active users were submitting on the order of several hundred new nodes per day. Even
more impressively, most reported OSM metrics showed exponential growth over a several
year period. Because this thesis is intended as net.Tagger’s inception, certain compromises
must be made in terms of resources and scalability. Its backend services reside on a VPS
that is capable of handling a reasonable number of app transactions, but would fail under the
load of larger projects such as OSM. The server’s resources can be scaled up to an extent,
but operating at a higher scale would likely require a distributed solution. Similarly, the
architecture choices described earlier place an emphasis on quick development turn-around,
which does not always result in optimization for large-scale deployment. This project’s
choices closely mirror the archetypal Linux Apache MySQL PHP (LAMP) stack with a
minor change to the database component, placing it on par with many other web-services
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projects. Additional improvements to net.Tagger’s web services will likely accompany
accompany the project’s expansion. Similarly, the GoogleMaps API key that the app relies
upon for generating its UI can only manage 25,000 requests per day before Google begins
charging proportionately to the request rate.
net.Tagger will initially be deployed with the understanding that it will not scale in its cur-
rent state. This thesis is designed to produce a proof-of-concept with limited release as
part of a long-term, multiple researcher project. Aiming for a fully fleshed-out first release
does not provide for feedback or course adjustments until a prohibitive amount of time and
resources have been expended. Because net.Tagger is unlikely to see widespread adoption
until released on several different smartphone platforms and bundled with user incentive de-
vices, the current server backend will likely be sufficient for the near future. Any scalability
issues that arise will be indicative of larger user adoption than anticipated, which would be
a sign of success. They will be resolved as they present themselves through further stu-
dent research projects and eventually seeking sponsorship funding after demonstrating the




This chapter presents results from net.Tagger’s initial release. We give overall metrics
for the current dataset, analysing tagging trends by type, provider, location, and inter-
event delay. Specific examples of high-quality tags are discussed, including ones that
utilize net.Tagger’s unique capacity to capture low-permanence infrastructure indicators.
We demonstrate tag validation through Google products and manual image inspection, cat-
egorizing submissions by accuracy for future research. Finally, we discuss examples of
erroneous net.Tagger user submissions, including methods for identifying errors and ex-
tracting useful information from incorrect tags.
Since the proposal stage of this thesis, its primary focus has been providing a working
proof-of-concept app/server framework. Because crowdsourced network mapping is a
largely untested concept in the larger research community, much of the net.Tagger project
thus far has been aimed at identifying target data and refining the collection process. Sec-
tion 2.5 discusses the results of the former, and Chapter 3 describes the latter. However,
even though this project’s primary goal is not data collection, a discussion of its preliminary
results is still relevant to demonstrate the utility of the net.Tagger implementation and show
what analysis will be possible after its future widespread release. Another valuable set of
results comes from our initial user community’s experience. Feedback on the user’s ex-
periences provides metrics about net.Tagger’s usability and whether portions of its design
enhance or detract from gathering useful data.
4.1 Initial Release
While net.Tagger’s eventual goal is to infer physical network topology, this requires a fairly
complete tag set of a given geographical area. Time and resources did not permit an app
release on a large enough scale to accomplish actual topology mapping. Without complete
coverage of an area, it is difficult to state whether a series of tags demonstrates a unique
underlying network feature or if further mapping of the surroundings would show a uniform
distribution of more tags without useful trends. At the time of this writing, net.Tagger
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is still in its beta testing phase, and the main intent of this limited release is identifying
and correcting performance and stability issues that did not present during development.
Releasing only to family members, Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) students, faculty,
professional colleagues, and friends with a clear description of the project’s current status
increases the likelihood of helpful user feedback. Skipping this step and pushing the app to
as large an audience as possible without a smaller initial release would likely end in many
of the target users discovering net.Tagger, experimenting briefly, and then uninstalling the
app out of frustration over its unpolished appearance and function.
Overall statistics for the project at this time are as follows:





Tags w/ Image 101
Total Providers 18
US States Represented 5
Countries Represented 2
The two most common reasons we received from 13 users who declined to participate were
“insufficient personal time to participate” and “no IOS version of app.” The following
figures display trends of the 9 contributing users. Figure 4.1 parallels similar projects
analyzed in Section 2.4.
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Figure 4.1: CDF of Tags by User
Even with a small sample size, a trend is clearly visible where a large number of users
accounted for a small portion of the total tags. Conversely, a small number of users con-
tributed the majority of the tags. Out of 166 tags, the top three users submitted 133 tags,
with 101 the highest number. Presumably, when net.Tagger scales up in size, this trend will
continue. Assuming rough equivalence with OSM use rates, we can anticipate most tags
coming from a core 5–10% section of users, with the rest of the user base submitting at
lower rates.
In Figure 4.2, we examine the number of distinct types (manhole, duct, etc) of infrastructure
tagged per user.
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Figure 4.2: CDF of Infrastructure Types by User
The maximum number of infrastructure types was 5, which 11.1% of our users reached.
In examining this metric, we seek to determine whether some users tag only one type of
infrastructure (perhaps because of where they live, or what they commonly notice), or are
adept at tagging many or all of the types of infrastructure in which we are interested. We
observe a generally uniform distribution of infrastructure types, suggesting that our user
base does not exhibit any particular bias in the tag types. In Figure 4.3, we examine the
number of different infrastructure providers in each user’s set of tags.
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Figure 4.3: CDF of Infrastructure Providers by User
Users were able to choose from six major providers, “unknown,” or an “other” option where
the user notes the name of the provider in their comments. The six specific providers were
selected based on informal analysis of the most common providers encountered during
initial fact finding research, with the intent of expanding and tailoring the app’s options
in future releases. Of the eight available options, the maximum number of providers was
five, achieved by 33.3% of users. Every user who submitted more than 10 tags fell into
this category. This result implies that users who contribute beyond a certain minimum
threshold will encounter a diverse set of providers, even if they limit themselves to one
geographic location. Fully 88.9% of users submitted at least one “other” tag, specifying an
additional provider. A further 66.6% of users submitted at least one “unknown” provider
tag. In Figure 4.4, we examine each user in terms of how many zip codes they submitted
tags from.
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Figure 4.4: CDF of Zipcodes by User
Although zip codes are defined and modified due to multiple metrics in addition to geo-
graphical zoning [48], they correspond to location and population distribution, providing
a useful approximation of a user’s tagging locations. Google’s Geocoding API [49] pro-
vides a reverse geocoding lookup feature that we utilized for this analysis. The service
requires crafting of simple HTTP requests with tag Lat/Longs as URL parameters to return
Javascript Object Notation (JSON) data including a zip code with suffix, which we auto-
mated to simplify analysis. The maximum number of zip codes for an individual user was
four, which 11.1% of users achieved. The same number of users only submitted from one
zip code, with all others visiting two or three. This indicates that even users with a small
number of tags will still exhibit some level of geographical diversity, while still remaining
relatively local.
Overall, infrastructure providers, types, and zipcodes all showed fairly uniform distribu-
tions. This might suggest that the variety of providers and tag types scales up as users
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expand their geographical area of coverage. However, the sample size is too small to be
conclusive at this point.
Figure 4.5 shows per-user delays between sequential tagging events.






















Figure 4.5: CDF of Tagging Delay
It suggests that most users submit tags in relatively rapid succession of several minutes
between tags and then are inactive for several hours or days. This demonstrates one method
of use envisioned in Section 3.1 of users allotting dedicated periods of time to tagging
instead of making periodic submissions over a larger period of time. Most users at this
time are gathering evidence by direct request of the net.Tagger team, which likely takes
the form of dedicated tagging trips. Another possible explanation for this trend is that
upon seeing a possible submission, users become aware of other possible tags in the area,
temporarily increasing their vigilance. If future research confirms this hypothesis, some
type of user notification when entering high-density areas might provide a similar effect.
This idea is more thoroughly explored in Chapter 5. User submission periods might become
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more regular as the net.Tagger community grows and community incentives are introduced.
Further research is necessary to determine if these inferences of behaviour are correct or if
current conditions of data collection are artificially introducing them.
4.2 Quality Examples
Some of our 166 tags serve as examples of ideal net.Tagger submissions by combining mul-
tiple indicators. They provide extra context of their surrounding areas even if the location
has not been exhaustively covered by net.Tagger users, permitting preliminary inferences
about underlying network topology.
The following submission images are presented with their verbatim database extract, repre-
senting the sum total of information available to us about a specific tag. Fields containing
Personally Identifying Information (PII) are censored in this section for privacy reasons.
Entries observe the following format:
Table 4.2: Database Entry Format
Tag ID TX ID User ID Lat Long Timestamp Provider Type Comments
Figure 4.6 combines three features in one: a duct marking, a “telephone” manhole cover,





Figure 4.6: Communications Vault with Duct
Even though networking equipment is not specifically referenced, FOCs carrying network
traffic are frequently co-located with phone lines due to the high expense of laying new
ducts. The markings and manhole access indicate some sort of central node, and the duct
marking gives context about how it connects to other nodes.
Figure 4.7 demonstrates a desirable net.Tagger datapoint by combining FOC ducts with a
building of some sort.
(91,C3ADC0DA3F8E36E09E67BC636AED99DD5F654505,XXX@XXXX,XX5893242,-
XXX5906732,"2016-02-08 16:56:20-05",Unknown,"Orange Marking (misc.)","Possibly
AT&T")
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Figure 4.7: Duct with Building
The user did not tag the building separately and likely did not identify the potential utility
of doing so, however their tag image shows the connection. It is possible that the duct sim-
ply passes under the building and the two have no relation, but their association increases
the likelihood that the building houses some type of networking equipment. net.Tagger
researchers would flag this as a location of interest and monitor the area for other tags indi-
cating additional FOCs or access points, looking for clues that the structure is a local nexus
of networking infrastructure.
4.3 Low-Permanence Indicators
A unique capability of net.Tagger is its ability to capture infrastructure indicators with
low persistence. While other mapping projects described in Chapter 2 target large, static
networking features such as railroad ROWs, net.Tagger can capture infrastructure with rel-
atively short-lived indicators when users are in the area tagging. Such “low-permanence”
indicators primarily concern FOC cables and ducts, which are valuable mapping data for
connecting network nodes. Because they are marked with chalk or street paint, FOC mark-
ings exist for short amounts of time, but are much more likely to indicate current informa-
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tion than other indicators. Figure 4.8 and Figure 4.9 show examples of this phenomena.
Figure 4.8: Orange Marking and TV Pedestal, Bark and Grass
Figure 4.9: Duct Marking, Grass
Because these examples are placed over grass and bark dust, they possess a low persistence
and will soon disappear from sight. As net.Tagger’s community increases in size, its ability
to capture temporary indicators will correspondingly grow as well.
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4.4 Tag Verification
Because the initial net.Tagger release only featured 12 users (9 actually contributing) spread
across 5 states, there were no cases of two users tagging the same finding. However, a
number of submissions were at least partially verifiable by searching the tag Lat/Long on
Google Earth and trying to match results against the user submitted tag image. This ap-
proach is potentially time consuming, as it requires manual human validation for each tag
and is not always successful if the target is out of sight from the Google Earth/StreetView
reference point. Because of these complications, manual verification would only be em-
ployed on a case-by-case basis by net.Tagger researchers who identified certain tags as
highly relevant for area-specific inferences. Despite its shortcomings, we successfully em-
ployed manual verification for both urban and rural locations to prove its utility. An urban
example of this process involves a tag in downtown Cambridge, MA. Figure 4.10 shows
the image submitted by the user, which, as a manhole stamped with “Communication,”
appears to meet all criteria of a good tag.
Figure 4.10: User-submitted Image
If net.Tagger researchers believed verification of this tag was necessary before relying on it
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for further inferences, it can be investigated via Google Earth’s StreetView feature. Figure
4.11 shows the overhead view of the tag’s coordinates on the left (Marker #113) and the
StreetView on the right.
Figure 4.11: Google Earth at Image Coordinates
Even at a lower resolution, several manholes are clearly visible that appear to match the
user tag image in 4.10. While not as conclusive as a matching tag from another user, at
least partial confirmation of the tag has been made.
This approach can even work in rural areas. One user submitted two tags within minutes
of each other in the middle of a forest on the Monterey Peninsula. The user indicated a
cell tower (Figure 4.12) and Pacific Bell handhole near each other in an area away from all
other structures except a construction site.
57
Figure 4.12: Cell Tower, User Submitted
Because cell towers often connect to adjacent FOC lines, the combination of a tower and
handhole in a more remote area is an important finding. When interviewed, the user con-
firmed this finding, stating that he discovered the tags while trail running. Even if the user
had not been available for comment, Google Earth can still provide initial confirmation.
Figure 4.13 shows the Google Earth coordinates of the cell tower tag (Marker #103) and
Pacific Bell handhole (Marker #104).
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Figure 4.13: Cell Tower, Google Earth
Although low resolution, Google Earth clearly shows the cell tower’s profile rising out of
the forest in the exact location that the user’s image and tag places it. It is not possible to
make out the handhole, but verifying one submission increases the chance that another tag
from the same user several minutes later is valid as well.
An additional verification process that focuses on the tag’s specific traits instead of its
location involves checking the user’s description of the item against the user-submitted
image. This is only possible if the user chooses to submit an image with their tag, which
will eventually be incentivized as discussed in Chapter 5. Infrastructure provider, type, and
comments can all be vetted against a submission image by a net.Tagger researcher in a brief
amount of time and the tag reliability ranked accordingly. For this thesis, we ranked tags
against their images according to the following categories:
• All data fields concurred with image. In Figure 4.14, the infrastructure type and
provider are clearly visible and concur with the user’s form submission.
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(’XX’, ’5EDDE570778C03D96FD378CBF012853BDAEA3309’, ’XX@XXXX’,
’XX5545949’, ’-XXX6765036’, ’2016-02-14 10:47:03-05’, ’Bell’, ’Manhole’,
’null’)
Figure 4.14: Bell Manhole
Although the user could have clarified “Bell System” in his comments, the tag entry
is still complete and contains no misleading or incorrect information. Submissions
in this category are confirmed by their images. In our initial dataset, 77 of 101 image
submissions fell into this category.
• Some data fields are incorrect, however the image contains enough information that
any errors are immediately apparent. Figure 4.15 shows a submission described by
the user as a handhole operated by an unknown provider.
(’XXX’, ’EAF724412CD9EC5D3456D5924CF42AB5366D32E7’, ’XXX@XXX’,
’XX5757070’, ’-XXX9336365’, ’2016-03-02 16:53:21-05’, ’Unknown’,
’Handhole’, ’null’)
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Figure 4.15: Mislabeled Manhole
A cursory inspection of the image shows a manhole instead of a handhole, which
the user has misidentified. However, the discrepancy is immediately apparent, and
the tag can be quickly updated by net.Tagger researchers with no loss of information
due to the error. The image even contains enough resolution to zoom in and read the
inscription “Bell System,” meaning that researchers can even fill in the user’s blank
provider field. Submissions in this category are confirmed, corrected, and potentially
improved by their images. In our initial dataset, 11 of 101 image submissions fell
into this category.
• No discrepancies between data fields and the image are visible, however the submis-
sion form data contains information not verifiable by the image. Tags in this category
are more complicated to categorize. The difficulty arises from the fact that net.Tagger
researchers do not know whether the extra information in the form is due to factors
not visible in the image, or represents a user error. Figure 4.16 shows a submission
where the user identified an orange marking and specified “Comcast” as the provider
in the tag comments section.
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(XX, ’75295219C09E3A5884AB85F5A3121E11D86A9607’, ’XXX@XXXX’,
’XX7180402’, ’-XXX6330881’, ’2016-02-29 17:24:18-05’, ’Other (note in
comments)’, ’Orange Marking (misc.)’, ’Comcast cable’)
Figure 4.16: Indeterminate Orange Marking
The image clearly shows a duct marking, indicating that the user partially identified
the correct infrastructure type. However, the user’s rationale for submitting Comcast
is not readily apparent. Normally, provider information for an orange marking would
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be painted on the ground or not marked at all. Because the image does not include the
provider name in the marking, the submission raises the question of whether the user
knows something not included in the image, or if the user is mistaken. net.Tagger
researchers possess a large enough sample set to determine fairly accurately from a
well-taken image what information is or isn’t available, and this image seems to lack
the information a user would need to accurately specify a provider. After reaching out
to the user, we determined that the marking led to a residence serviced by Comcast,
thus the submission was accurate. If this additional validation step was not available,
the apparent discrepancy between form data and image would have forced net.Tagger
researchers to partially downgrade the submission, keeping the infrastructure type
but classifying the provider as “unknown.” Submissions in this category might be
partially invalidated by their images, but still contain some useful information on a
case-by-case basis. In our initial dataset, 6 of 101 image submissions fell into this
category.
• The image contains enough information to determine that the submission does not
represent a valid net.Tagger data point. A detailed treatment of this category is
given in Section 4.6. User submitted images provide the most reliable means to vet
net.Tagger data through this process. In our initial dataset, 7 of 101 image submis-
sions fell into this category. It is important to note that these erroneous submissions
are not necessarily due to user incompetence or a misunderstanding of net.Tagger
principles. Users are subject to their own time constraints while participating and are
not expected to be subject matter experts. Many of our test users expressed concern
about potentially submitting erroneous data, and we assured them that providing im-
ages along with their tag data would give the net.Tagger team the means to vet their
finds. The limited scope of this project allows us to tightly control more variables
than a full-scale release; a feature we took advantage of by instructing our users that
when in doubt about a finding, they should submit anyway. This helps fulfil one




Much of the need for projects such as net.Tagger comes from the large variety of compet-
ing and overlapping telecommunications providers who communally own and operate the
Internet backbone’s infrastructure. As different corporations change ownership, merge, ac-
quire new assets, and lease infrastructure to others, the infrastructure indicators targeted by
net.Tagger have the potential to become increasingly obfuscated. The “comments” section
of a net.Tagger app submission is of critical importance to augmenting a tag and mitigating
data gathering challenges. Even minor or incomplete tag comments can give net.Tagger
researchers insights into the validity and relevance of a given tag for making further infer-
ences. The more tags a user submits, the more likely he or she will begin to build a picture
of what infrastructure indicator trends exist in their local area, and which of their findings
are unique or relevant in a broader context. Ideally, as the net.Tagger user base grows and
matures, tag comments will grow in importance and usefulness. Even in net.Tagger’s cur-
rent phase, tag comments are an important tool to fill in information gaps not covered by the
app’s dropdown options in the data submission screen. Putting too many options in a menu
clutters the UI, removing a user from the submission cycle. Once the net.Tagger dataset is
large enough, the app can be modified to offer a location aware selection that offers a user
the most prevalent providers in the area to choose from. This can be further combined with
on-device caching of the users’ past submissions to simplify the submission process for
users on an individual basis. Tag comments can not only clarify submissions, but provide
additional data sources for net.Tagger researchers to mine for possible app improvements.
As an example of tag comment utility, different telecommunications providers such as
AT&T and CenturyLink own or operate part of the historic Bell System, often as inde-
pendent entities. Listing all these possibilities in the app’s data submission screen would
likely lead to user frustration. However, our initial findings showed that most users will
still clarify which specific Bell iteration they have discovered in their comments. Out of
the 35 tags users labelled as “Bell,” we received comments clarifying “Pacific Bell,” “Bell
Telephone,” “Pacific Telephone,” and “Bell System.” This amplifying information is useful
for determining local provider trends and isolating specific infrastructure features.
Unfortunately, many tags in the initial net.Tagger dataset either lack comments or do not
contain enough information to be useful. Of 166 tags, 51 did not include any, representing
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approximately 20% of all submissions.
4.6 Errors and Noise
Preliminary interpretation of the 166 tags at the time of this thesis shows a number of
complications. Because of the close ties of active users to the net.Tagger team, reaching
out for clarification was much more straightforward than with a general public release. This
offered a temporary advantage in determining if a submission was truly erroneous or only
appeared so based on the data available. For example, the following tag (Figure 4.17) was




Figure 4.17: Duct Marking Tag
The user’s data entry indicates a sidewalk duct marking, annotating the marking’s text
in the comments section. However, viewing the image submitted with the tag shows a
duct marking that appears to be drawn in red paint, which by APWA standards would
indicate electrical power instead of telecommunications equipment. Under the information
available between the tag entry and attached image, net.Tagger researchers would likely
conclude that the user mistakenly submitted a power cable duct as as telecommunications
asset, requiring reclassification of the tag as inaccurate. However, after discussing the tag
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with its responsible user, we concluded that he could properly identify PMS 144 Orange,
and local lighting conditions caused his smartphone camera to misrepresent the color of the
markings.
Other submissions (Figure 4.18) were clearly erroneous, however verification was straight-
forward because the users were careful to provide details in their comments.
(86,524B8FABBE717B5AACCEFC4383BE6B82176B8865,XXX@XXXX,XX5796949,-
XXX6177637,"2016-02-05 14:40:39-05","Other (note in
comments)",Manhole,"PacfiCorps electrical vault")
Figure 4.18: Electrical Vault Tag
This submission came from a user lacking a networking background. Upon analysis, the
image lacks positive indicators of networking equipment, and PacifiCorps is a utility com-
pany that does not provide telecommunications services. When interviewed, the user stated
that he was unsure about the find, but chose to submit with as many details as possible to
facilitate eventual verification. Vetting the tag was simple for the net.Tagger team, and the
same user submitted a number of high quality tags in the adjacent area.
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Other erroneous tags (Figure 4.19) did not have additional comments, but could still be
downgraded in reliability due to the image.
(112,855D69370A5AE4B5E8375091D85A98781B3C43C4,XXX@XXXX,
XX3627900,-XX0911454,"2016-03-03 16:21:44-05",Qwest,Manhole, null)
Figure 4.19: Qwest Manhole Tag
This submission was marked as a Qwest manhole with no amplifying comments. The man-
hole bears the engraving “BECo,” which according to low validity sources [50] is the mark-
ing for Brooklyn Edison Company, a power utility company based in New York City. Based
on the conflicting tag data/image information, this data point does not possess enough reli-
ability to be used for future inferences without more information.
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Some research projects complete their investigations and list “Future Work” ideas as an
afterthought with minimal content. Because this thesis represents the first effort in creat-
ing the larger net.Tagger initiative, this chapter takes on significant importance. While the
net.Tagger project has a clearly defined goal – broad mapping of physical network infras-
tructure through crowdsourcing – the specific implementation and requirements continue to
be refined. Implementing an initial mobile app and server framework, performing data col-
lection, and gathering user feedback allowed us to identify additional features and project
enhancements that will greatly increase the quality and utility of research findings going
forward.
This chapter addresses four categories of future work for net.Tagger. A primary area of
work will involve additions and enhancements to the smartphone app, including porting
to other platforms, enhancing the UI, and increasing the map overlay to include the en-
tire project dataset. Second to be upgraded is the backend server infrastructure. This in-
cludes a full security audit, better web services handling, and integration with the OSM
stack and dataset to perform native map renders. Third, data analysis and data fusion will
greatly enhance the research value of the project dataset. Finally, and most importantly for




While the UI has undergone considerable evolution over the course of this project, it is still
a product of the short development timeframe. Due to the increasing quality of most smart-
phone apps, potential users are likely to view the quality of new apps as a function of visual
presentation, workflow intuitiveness, and overall ease of use. Even if UI features do not di-
rectly increase the quality of collected data, they are still important to net.Tagger’s success
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as a crowdsourcing project. An intuitive user experience will provide fewer entry barriers
to users, particularly those lacking a technical background who might be intimidated by a
less usable set-up. The main display can be improved through implementation of minor
features such as using slide-out menus instead of static buttons, which crowd the display
when not being used. Multiple beta testers were concerned about their ability to submit
accurate data. Because these users were people already possessing technical backgrounds,
their concerns indicate that the entire spectrum of potential users would benefit from ad-
ditional in-app resources guiding the submission process. One feature accomplishing this
is a tutorial style walkthrough offered to users upon a fresh install. Many apps provide
a demonstration of this sort, since static “Help” documentation does not always translate
into practical understanding for all users. Some testers reported an initial hesitancy to begin
tagging for fear that they would make a mistake and pollute the project database with false
information. In addition to a walkthrough, another feature that would ease their concerns
is the ability for users to delete their own tags if they feel the submission was errant. Cur-
rently, there is no delete mechanism in the app. However, multiple testers inadvertantly
submitted tags when first exploring the app and voiced concern that they could not clean
up their mistakes. Giving users the power to delete tags allows them to experiment without
fear of messing up, not only reducing research errors but also shortening the time between
installation and feeling comfortable about participating. For research purposes, deleting
a tag in the app should not actually delete the information from the net.Tagger database.
Knowing how frequently users delete data relative to time spent using the app is a useful
metric for researchers. If multiple users submit and delete tags in a specific location, this
could indicate that an infrastructure indicator exists but is ambiguous and needs further val-
idation before using it for network inferences. Instead of actually deleting the submission
from the net.Tagger database, the in-app delete option should flag the appropriate database
entry, remove the marker from the user’s map, and display a user message that the tag is
deleted. This provides the user with assurance that the net.Tagger team knows of the error
while still preserving the data for other purposes. Combining a tutorial walkthrough with
tag deletion capability will ensure that users feel more confident about participating while
increasing the likelihood of correct submissions.
In addition to app UI improvements that will help users get started with net.Tagger, other
planned features will assist users while gathering data. One feature suggested by test users
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is automated notifications once the user enters a new area with few or no tags. Users
will be able to enable this feature from a settings dialog and configure it to define what
a “new area” consists of. For example, a user could set their net.Tagger instance to alert
them if they are more than a certain distance from any of their past submissions. Another
alert might trigger if the user is near an unverified tag from another user, indicating nearby
targets of opportunity. Not all users will desire a notification feature, and it is of little utility
for users during dedicated tagging sessions who have the app open where they can actively
see the map. However, other users might be interested in submitting intermittent tags while
they are performing other tasks, and would appreciate notifications informing them that
they are in a potential tagging location. The notification feature can be further integrated
with the upgraded map display to display helpful messages to users when it triggers.
5.1.2 App Backend
In addition to the UI improvements of Section 5.1.1, some improvements to the app’s back-
end are necessary before undertaking broader distribution efforts. Of primary importance is
improving the app’s location sensor routines, which define the precision and regularity with
which the app samples the user’s GPS coordinates. Currently, the app uses manually coded
location routines that use fine-grained Android functions instead of more granular API
methods. These provide the high accuracy necessary for accurate tag measurements, but
place an unreasonably high load on the smartphone’s battery life. Android developer guid-
ance recommends using native location tools available as part of Google Play service APIs,
as they automate these processes to optimize battery life without compromising location
accuracy. Unfortunately, net.Tagger cannot make use of them until the app is registered
with the Google Play Store. Once they become available to the project, refactoring the
app’s code to use them will provide better battery usage, reducing the potential for users
to become frustrated with the app. Market research surveys of app users [51] identifies
battery issues as a motivating factor in users giving negative reviews or uninstalling apps,
particularly with mapping applications. This gives net.Tagger incentive to use all available
resources to manage app resources well. Other smartphone sensors discussed in Section
2.6.2 can be leveraged to improve research data without requiring active user action. The
Android orientation sensor can be used to directly calculate the orientation of a device
relative to magnetic north, however it requires substantial processing power and has been
71
deprecated since Android 2.2 [52]. Android provides methods that calculate equivalent re-
sults without utilizing raw orientation sensor data. Another capability that can be leveraged
futher is the GPS sensor. Currently, the app only transmits a lat/long and blocks users from
submitting if the GPS sensor’s calculated accuracy is less than 30.0 meters. Instead of set-
ting an accuracy limit, the app will transmit the sensor’s accuracy at time of submission.
The combination of lat/long, position sensor accuracy, and device orientation for each tag
will provide a much more accurate tag than lat/long alone.
Another useful capability to implement would be the ability to store user submissions on
the smartphone if network services are not available, permitting users in remote locations
to tag findings for upload once service is restored. This feature would require careful
implementation and configurability from the user’s settings menu. Mismanagement could
place a burden on device storage and mobile data, particularly if the user accumulates a
large number of findings before reentering a service area. These issues could be addressed
by allowing users to place storage limits on the app and limit burst transmissions to when
the phone is connected to wifi networks. This would function similarly to smartphones that
avoid downloading app updates until connected to wifi, preventing excessive mobile data
consumption.
To facilitate future software development, the net.Tagger app should continually improve
its error handling and crash reporting. Currently, the app utilizes the Application Crash
Reports for Android (ACRA) library, which automatically sends stack traces and phone
version information to a net.Tagger server upon full crashes. This proved very useful during
the initial app release, when almost half of net.Tagger users experienced unrecoverable
crashes during installation. ACRA crash reports quickly narrowed the problem to Android
Version 6 smartphones, which utilize a radically different permissions model than versions
used during development testing. Once identified, the issue was quickly patched and a new
version pushed out. While these reports are invaluable, they only provide information when
the app experiences a complete crash, which should occur less frequently as the production
code evolves to better anticipate error conditions. These improvements come at the cost
of less information to troubleshoot issues. Even if the app handles errors without full-
on crashing, different features may still not be functioning as intended. While coding and
testing, net.Tagger developers can make use of debugging features such as Android Studio’s
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LogCat to view helpful messages about the app’s state. Before large-scale distribution,
net.Tagger should implement improved logging systems to send relevant information about
experimental or high probability of failure processes to net.Tagger servers. Unlike now, a
full-scale release does not offer the ability to reach out and contact users about their issues
as readily, and automated processes must be put in place to collect relevant information.
5.1.3 Distribution
A successful crowdsourcing project relies on effective advertising and providing a simple
way for potential users to obtain and install the app. Currently, the net.Tagger app exists
as an .apk file download on a Center for Measurement and Analysis of Network Data
(CMAND) website. This approach requires users to visit the website, manually download
the .apk file, disable their smartphone’s security protections against third party unverified
apps, and finally install the app. While sufficient for initial beta testers already associated
with CMAND, this implementation is not suitable for wider distribution. The next logical
step is signing, registering, and importing the app into the Google Play Store. In addition
to increasing net.Tagger’s profile to its potential user community, most smartphone owners
will not trust anything outside of official distribution channels, and release through the
Play Store removes many security concerns users might have with a third party app. Also
important to the project’s success is the ability to push out updated versions of the app to
users as the improvements described in this chapter are implemented. Hosting the app as
a file download on the net.Tagger website requires users to download fresh copies every
time a release is made. The effort this entails reduces the likelihood users will perform the
extra step, hindering the project’s ability to grow and expand. Integration with the Play
Store gives project developers the means to release updates with a far greater certainty that
users will receive and automatically install them. The Play Store also provides users with
the means to assign numerical ratings and reviews of apps, which gives net.Tagger another
source of feedback. While a useful asset, Play Store feedback also increases the importance
of identifying and removing as many bugs as possible before release, as bad initial reviews
could discourage potential users from installing. To this end, net.Tagger should ensure
compliance with Android’s published series of quality control guidelines [53] before app
release. Once better mechanisms of distribution are in place, net.Tagger can take advantage
of additional resources to more broadly advertise the project. Resources such as the North
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American Network Operators Group (NANOG) Mailing List or OSM forums can be used
to both increase project visibility and solicit feedback.
5.1.4 Platform Porting
Currently, net.Tagger only exists for Android devices. The Android development commu-
nity provided many useful features and resources that were a key factor in producing a
usable prototype within the time constraints of this project. However, limiting net.Tagger
to Android would neglect the sizable market share of potential users who use other smart-
phone platforms such as Apple’s IOS. In late 2015, IOS represented approximately 28%
of the US market share, second to Android’s 67% but well ahead of Windows’ third place
3.5% [54]. Technologically, it is not possible to port or cross-compile net.Tagger’s java-
based Android code directly to IOS’s Objective-C. However, the UI design, workflow, and
server infrastructure can be reused, amortizing the cost of design and testing of these com-
ponents. Instead of writing the IOS app from scratch, it can be built to an existing specifi-
cation and template, thereby presenting fewer challenges to an experienced programmer.
5.1.5 Map Display
Currently, the net.Tagger app main screen displays the individual user’s submission history
in the form of markers placed on a Google Map overlay. The app accomplishes this by
keeping a local data file holding their past tags in the app’s private directory. Every time the
user submits a tag, the file is updated and the map reloaded to enter the marker. Although
the data file can store many different types of data, the only information currently stored
is a tag id and lat/long for each submission. The main advantage of this approach is that
it requires no management of a distributed dataset. Each user’s smartphone maintains a
local copy of its history while sending more detailed submission reports to the central
server. A more ideal app configuration would display markers representing the majority
or all of the net.Tagger dataset to indicate areas that have already been searched. Users
should be able to set a variety of display filters on their map, including displaying all tags
by all users, all tags by the smartphone’s owner, all unverified tags, and tags by indicator
type. This will allow users to scale back their display if app performance and mobile data
are an issue, as well as assisting users conducting searches to target specific leaderboard
categories. This would permit users to investigate existing findings to perform verification
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tags or avoid them in order to search for original findings. Including this feature will
require additional network functionality and careful consideration to avoid burdening users’
smartphones. Other applications such as Google Maps also allow users to tag features such
as gas stations and restaurants. However, implementing this in net.Tagger will require extra
caution due to substantial amount of data that must be pushed to users in areas with a high
infrastructure indicator density. With careful planning and scheduling of data pushes to
users, net.Tagger will be able to provide a dynamic, informative display to its users without
incurring performance or data consumption issues.
5.2 Server
5.2.1 Security Considerations
net.Tagger was intentionally designed to limit the amount of sensitive data it transmits
and stores. User submissions including profile data, tag data, and images, are sent via
https POST messages utilizing Android’s built-in security certificates. This delegates the
security of sensitive data in transit to existing security implementations, providing a higher
level of security than creating custom net.Tagger transmission protocols. A more likely risk
comes from a breach of data residing on the net.Tagger server. Instead of the convenience
of built-in methods for the app, the net.Tagger server must host and secure multiple web and
database services while ensuring their availability for all required processes. The simplest
means of securing data at rest on the net.Tagger server is to refrain from storing data that
requires securing. A user profile only contains a nickname, email address, country, and
password. The only information intended to be uniquely identifying is the email address,
which is used to distinguish users for research purposes, and the nickname, which will be
publicly available on the leaderboard once implemented. This reduces both the potential
consequences of a data breach as well as the likelihood of attackers viewing net.Tagger as
a worthwhile target. However, this does not eliminate the need for the net.Tagger research
team to protect PII entrusted to them by the user community. Because of the tendency for
people to reuse passwords and email addresses when registering for web services, access
to the four components of a net.Tagger profile could give attackers information useful for
targeting users on websites unrelated to net.Tagger.
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Limiting user data reduces security requirements of the project to following best practices
and using built-in features of its native software packages. net.Tagger backend components
such as Apache and PHP have established security practices dictated by their own [55] or
third party foundations [56] providing guidance that is sufficient to secure most simple web
applications using their products. Basic security precautions for net.Tagger are in place,
such as storing user passwords in the profile database after hashing and salting with PHP’s
native password handling features. However, because of this project’s short development
time, a full security audit of the app and backend server is still pending.
Any audit will have to take into consideration three possible attacker objectives: data theft,
data corruption, and service interruption. Data thieves would target user profile or tag data.
Both types of data include database entries, with tag data also including seperately stored
image files. Tag images would be of little utility without the accompanying database entries
to correlate them to users and locations, so any data theft attacks would involve some form
of database attack.
Data corruption attacks would attempt to either delete and corrupt data stored on the server
or insert false data points. Instead of exfiltrating data, these adversaries actively seek to
modify data on the server. While more disruptive, modification attacks are harder to execute
against the net.Tagger server because most of them would require some form of superuser
permission. The PHP scripts that interface between received tag data and the databases
do not have modification or delete database privileges, which exist only for the postgres
superuser.
An attacker could attempt to craft fake tag submissions, which are simple HTTP POST
messages carrying JSON data and could be easily replicated. However, the server scripts
will not accept submissions without a valid session ID from an app instance, which can only
be generated by submitting credentials that match profile entries on record in the database.
Even though corruption attacks may be more difficult to launch, the security audit should
still ensure that all Apache, PHP, and database instances are locked down to reduce their
likelihood of occurring.
Finally, service interruption attacks would attempt to deny net.Tagger server availablility
through some form of Denial of Service (DoS) attack. These adversaries could perform
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large numbers of web requests or make net.Tagger submissions that do not require sessions
credentials, such as submitting profile data to fill up the database. Although there are
limited remediations against these attacks, an audit could ensure that the net.Tagger server
has enough scalable resources available to adapt to any DoS attempts.
5.2.2 OSM Integration
net.Tagger is heavily inspired by the OSM project and will likely draw upon the OSM
software stack and dataset for future work. Because of OSM’s open source philosophy
and licensing, net.Tagger can employ these resources free of any reimbursement or com-
pensation as long as any use is properly credited. An explicit goal of the project is the
eventual integration of net.Tagger’s data into the OSM community. Further, because the
OSM community represents a large population segment of users who have similar motiva-
tions to the desired net.Tagger user community, e.g., individuals who voluntarily annotate
maps, bidirectional interaction between net.Tagger and OSM is a potential means of fur-
thering net.Tagger’s goals. Such integration could be accomplished by importing verified
net.Tagger data into the OSM dataset. OSM emphasizes above-ground features that can
be verified by other mappers as part of its implementation philosophy, with no real means
to record virtualized inferences of below-ground networks [57]. However, the street-level
infrastructure indicators from net.Tagger can be recorded in OSM much like other street
level OSM features such as bike racks or utility poles. Importing part or all of the even-
tual net.Tagger dataset into OSM is not without its potential disadvantages, and would only
happen after a careful cost-benefit analysis. Any import could only take place after inter-
acting with and gaining approval from the OSM Import Mailing List [58] to ensure that the
bulk data met OSM standards and was appropriately categorized.
5.2.3 Native Renders
Currently, the only means to render tag data in a map overlay is through the app’s Google
Maps API. The Google Maps API was chosen as an expedient way to meet the project’s
time constraints. Although useful for prototyping, long-term reliance on a proprietary map-
ping API conflicts with several of net.Tagger’s core objectives. net.Tagger aims to provide
map renders on multiple platforms, including Android, IOS, and web browsers. Addition-
ally, net.Tagger seeks to maintain as much compatibility with OSM as possible to permit
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use of and possible future integration with the OSM dataset. Finally, most members of
net.Tagger’s target user community are associated with open source projects and initiatives
that emphasize information sharing and openness of data and methods. Considering these
factors, migrating map renders to an open source, OSM compatible approach is a logical
next step for both web and app displays. Fortunately, the OSM software stack meets all of
these criteria. Although there is no one standard OSM approach to rendering and serving
map tiles, a standard community approach uses an open source rendering software known
as Mapnik [59] [60] in combination with helper packages to pull data from a PostGIS
database, overlay it onto an existing GIS dataset (such as the OSM planet file), and serve
the resulting map tiles via an Apache web server. Various OSM sub-communities provide
documentation of their setups to assist others in deploying map servers using free, open
source software. Various toolkits also exist to directly integrate OSM data into apps. One
example is OSMDroid [61], an open source toolkit using OSM data as a direct replace-
ment for most GoogleMaps API features. This would permit a straightforward port of the
net.Tagger app from GoogleMaps to OSM based displays without requiring extensive code
rewrites. The net.Tagger project can incorporate these resources as part of its expanded
web and app presence.
5.3 Data Analysis
While much of this thesis covers net.Tagger’s crowdsourcing implementation, the core goal
of the project remains analyzing and drawing useful physical network topology inferences.
Before useful analysis can take place, collected data must be initially categorized and vet-
ted. A key part of this process is extracting information from submission images and aug-
menting the user’s form data inferences. However, the anticipated volume of data implies
that manual inspection by the small project team is not possible. Several possibilities exist
to automate or outsource this process.
5.3.1 Image Recognition
Although image recognition technology has limitations, it still represents a potential means
to identify net.Tagger’s targets. Many of the indicators in Section 2.5 have distinct shapes
such as circles (manhole covers) and rectangles (handholes), or color (PMS 144 Orange).
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Image recognition software could theoretically search for these predetermined shapes and
colors in user images and check them against what the user identified as the find. Depending
on the image quality and camera perspective, markings and text in images could potentially
be analyzed with Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software as well, however, human-
based verification will also play a large role. More complex shapes such as cell towers
and buildings may not lend themselves to automated cataloguing, due to their lack of a
generalized shape or intentional obfuscation, as discussed in Section 2.5.6. However, all
other infrastructure indicators possess a specific shape that can be target with information
recognition software.
5.3.2 Mechanical Turk
To extract more detailed information from images, net.Tagger could integrate with Ama-
zon’s Mechanical Turk service [62]. Mechanical Turk is a crowdsourced Amazon Web Ser-
vice (AWS) allowing individuals, researchers, or businesses to submit Human Intelligence
Tasks (HITs), small chores that are difficult to complete via computer but easily accom-
plished by a human being. Volunteers perform the tasks and receive a small compensation
for each HIT, usually on the order of a few cents. Mechanical Turk lends itself well to im-
age processing, particularly matching patterns or extracting text. These capabilities could
be employed to verify images such as the previously mentioned cell towers and buildings.
A sample HIT might involve presenting an image that a net.Tagger user categorized as
a Level3 Telecommunications building, then asking the Mechanical Turk user questions
such as “Is this picture of a building? What company names are present?” Mechanical
Turk could also be used to supplement automated image recognition. For example, orange
street markings frequently contain descriptive labels written freehand in street paint that are
far less legible than stamped manhole inscriptions. If image recognition software detects
the PMS 144 color in a user submission, the image could be redirected to Mechanical Turk
to ask if any phrases exist in the picture.
5.4 User Incentives
The success of any crowdsourcing project relies on a simple principle: the project must
provide its users with reasons motivating them to join, contribute, and continue partic-
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ipating long enough to provide useful data. Incentives can take many forms, including
monetary, prestige, or conditional access to an asset. Depending on the resources available
to a project, multiple forms of incentives can be combined to target a larger potential user
base.
5.4.1 Leaderboard
The planned incentive net.Tagger will incorporate into its initial large-scale deployment
involves recognizing users based on the quantity, quality, and type of their submissions.
These rankings will be displayed in an online “leaderboard” displaying users according
to their tagging accomplishments. A key advantage of such a system is that net.Tagger
administrators can assign points (or negative points) to different types of actions that factor
into a user’s ranking score. Possible point strategies for different categories of submission
include:
• Submitting an original tag with an accompanying image and user comments. This
would be worth the maximum number of points, as it provides not only the stan-
dard submission data, but a means of verification. For example, if a user selects one
infrastructure type from the app UI, but enters comments about a different type, re-
searchers can assign a lower probability that the submission is accurate. An image
provides even better verification ability, where researchers can clearly see if a user
inferred correct information about a submission.
• Submitting an original tag without an image or comments. In order to account for
users with constraints on their time or phone data plans, net.Tagger provides the abil-
ity to submit tags containing only app form data and GPS sensor information. These
submissions are still useful, particularly if verified through multiple users tagging
the same find. However, they provide less data than a full submission, and would be
worth fewer points.
• A bonus for submitting an especially valuable tag. A unique feature of net.Tagger
is its ability to gather data about infrastructure indicators that only exist temporarily,
primarily orange street markings that eventually fade and wash away (section 2.5.1).
These markings provide some of the best data, including the streetwise orientation
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of the infrastructure. Because the markings exist for a much shorter time than more
permanent infrastructure such as manhole covers, any indicated provider name is
more likely to be current and accurate. The leaderboard algorithm can provide a point
bonus for submission and verification of temporary markings, encouraging users to
seek them out before they disappear.
• Verifying another user’s submission. To increase the validity of research data, users
can be prompted to seek out and verify other submissions. This feature could not be
implemented until the enhanced map display (5.1.5) is implemented. A verification
feature could be presented to users as a means for newer users to gain early points.
The verification feature introduces new error handling abilities, but must be handled care-
fully to avoid unintended consequences. Allowing users to essentially “challenge” submis-
sions made by others if they cannot replicate the same results might provide an incentive
to submit false tags to earn points for themselves while subtracting points from the original
tagger. Unethical users trying to attain and stay at the top of the leaderboard could easily
take advantage of verifications. Even discounting the potential effects of user misconduct,
other situations might produce negative results as well. Because of their non-permanency,
orange street markings disappear after a relatively short amount of time, and a user attempt-
ing to verify them weeks or months after the original tag could find nothing and submit a
challenge even though the initial tag was correct. The variable accuracy of smartphone
GPS units means that a tagged item does not exist where the tag lat/long indicates, but
somewhere in a circle with a radius equal to the GPS error. In dense urban areas with high
concentrations of infrastructure indicators, a verifying user might go to a tagged location,
mistake one infrastructure indicator for another, and erroneously verify or challenge the
wrong indicator. The verification process will require careful planning to avoid exploita-
tion or inadvertantly introducing additional errors into the net.Tagger dataset.
In addition to a web-based leaderboard, the app will eventually have a local leaderboard of
its own. The online leaderboard has the advantage of immediate access to the net.Tagger
database, making calculation and display of the entire user community straightforward.
Pushing out these results to the distributed network of user smartphones, however, is less
simple. To compromise, each smartphone’s leaderboard might display a smaller subset of
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results. This can be automated simply, with each app instance requesting updated results
from the net.Tagger server once per day and receiving the ranked top ten as well as the
standing of the user associated with the specific instance.
To further encourage competition, the user community can be permitted to form teams
ranging from small groups of peers to entire countries. Displaying leaderboard rankings
by country can be done with minimal extra effort because the information is included in
each user profile. Allowing users to form additional groups would foster collaboration on
a smaller scale.
5.4.2 Micropayments
Much like Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, users could be paid a small amount in money or
some form of credit. This feature would not be feasible without project sponsorship, and
would thus be reserved for more mature releases. Because users might be tempted to submit
false data to gain monetary rewards, delaying this feature would also allow fine-tuning of
the verification process to better identify and prevent user fraud. Providing monetary com-
pensation for all users and all submissions could easily lead to fraud, with users submitting
fake tags in order to artificially boost numbers. Users would likely be required to undergo
additional registration or vetting before becoming eligible to receive compensation. They
might be initially required to to submit a certain number of verified tags, and only begin re-
cieving compensating after passing a predetermined threshold. Even though this increases
the administrative burden on project administrators, only a small number of users would
likely qualify for this feature. As OSM demonstrates [32], the majority of high quality
submissions would likely come from only a few percent of project participants. In order
to increase the difficulty of faking a tag, compensation would be limited to submissions
including images.
5.4.3 Dataset
Like OSM, net.Tagger’s potential users exist on a spectrum, from casual users participating
as a novelty to more dedicated, enthusiastic users with technical backgrounds employed
in related areas of research or academia. Less invested users are unlikely to be inter-
ested in the accumulated project data beyond viewing maps of their findings. However,
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users working in similar research areas might desire access to portions of the net.Tagger
dataset. Where micropayments would target high-performing individual users, access to
part of net.Tagger’s dataset would be an incentive aimed at research groups or similar en-
tities providing some benefit to net.Tagger through established relationships. Much like
micropayments and exporting data to the OSM project, providing other researchers access
to the net.Tagger dataset would not be implemented until the project matures, in contrast to
leaderboard implementation, which is of immediate interest.
83
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
84
List of References
[1] E. Çetinkaya, M. Alenazi, A. Peck, J. Rohrer, and J. Sterbenz, “Multilevel resilience
analysis of transportation and communication networks,” Telecommunication
Systems, vol. 60, no. 4, pp. 515–537, 2015. [Online]. Available: http:
//dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11235-015-9991-y
[2] R. Durairajan, S. Ghosh, X. Tang, P. Barford, and B. Eriksson, “Internet atlas:
A geographic database of the Internet,” in Proceedings of the 5th ACM Workshop
on HotPlanet, ser. HotPlanet ’13. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2013, pp. 15–20.
[Online]. Available: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2491159.2491170
[3] R. Singel. (2008, January). Fiber optic cable cuts isolate millions from
Internet, future cuts likely. Wired Magazine. [Online]. Available: http:
//www.wired.com/2008/01/fiber-optic-cab/
[4] J. Hawkinson and T. Bates, “Guidelines for creation, selection, and registration
of an Autonomous System (AS),” RFC 1930 (Best Current Practice), Internet
Engineering Task Force, Mar. 1996, updated by RFCs 6996, 7300. [Online].
Available: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1930.txt
[5] P. FARATIN, D. CLARK, S. BAUER, W. LEHR, P. GILMORE, and A. BERGER,
“The growing complexity of Internet interconnection,” Communications &
Strategies, vol. 1, no. 72, pp. 51–72, 4th quart 2008. [Online]. Available:
https://www.akamai.com/us/en/multimedia/documents/technical-publication/the-
growing-complexity-of-internet-interconnection-technical-publication.pdf
[6] R. Durairajan, P. Barford, J. Sommers, and W. Willinger, “Intertubes: A
study of the us long-haul fiber-optic infrastructure,” SIGCOMM Comput.
Commun. Rev., vol. 45, no. 5, pp. 565–578, Aug. 2015. [Online]. Available:
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2829988.2787499
[7] A. Taube. (2013, Jun). Sprint settles cable right-of-way suit. Law360. [Online].
Available: http://www.law360.com/articles/453369/sprint-settles-cable-right-of-
way-suit
[8] If you own or owned land under or next to railroad rights of way where
fiber-optic cable was installed, you could receive money from a class action
settlement. FiberOpticSettlements. [Online]. Available: https://fiberopticsettlements.
com/rhodeisland/Portals/0/Documents/RI%20ROW%20Notice.pdf
85
[9] D. Tan, A. Grieco, and Y. Fainman, “Towards 100 channel dense wavelength division
multiplexing with 100ghz spacing on silicon,” Optics express, vol. 22, no. 9, pp.
10 408–10 415, 2014.
[10] (2012). Executive order – accelerating broadband infrastructure deployment, EO
13616. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/14/executive-order-
accelerating-broadband-infrastructure-deployment. Washington DC.
[11] (2012). Executive order on accelerating broadband infrastructure deployment.
Federal Highway Administration. [Online]. Available: http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/
policy/otps/exeorder.cfm
[12] H.r.3805 - broadband conduit deployment act of 2015. [Online]. Available:
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/3805/titles
[13] D. McCabe. (2015, Oct). ‘dig once’ eyed for broadband expansion.
[Online]. Available: http://thehill.com/policy/technology/257981-dig-once-eyed-for-
broadband-expansion
[14] Broadband opportunity council final report. [Online]. Available: https://www.
whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/broadband_opportunity_council_report_final.pdf
[15] A. Blum, Tubes: A Journey to the Center of the Internet. New York City, NY: Ecco,
2013.
[16] (2001, Jul). National traffic safety board railroad accident brief. National
Traffic Safety Board. [Online]. Available: http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/
AccidentReports/Reports/RAB0408.pdf
[17] N. J. Victory. (2006, Jun). Report and recommendations of the independent panel
reviewing the impact of hurricane katrina on communications networks. Federal
Communications Commission. [Online]. Available: https://transition.fcc.gov/pshs/
docs/advisory/hkip/karrp.pdf
[18] F. Holzhauer, “Ip geolocation,” TU Berlin, Tech. Rep., 2007. [Online]. Available:
http://www.net.t-labs.tu-berlin.de/teaching/ss07/IM_seminar/aa_b1.pdf
[19] S. Siwpersad, B. Gueye, and S. Uhlig, “Assessing the geographic resolution of
exhaustive tabulation for geolocating Internet hosts,” in Passive and Active Network
Measurement, ser. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, M. Claypool and S. Uhlig,
Eds. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2008, vol. 4979, pp. 11–20. [Online]. Available:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-79232-1_2
86
[20] V. N. Padmanabhan and L. Subramanian, “An investigation of geographic mapping
techniques for Internet hosts,” SIGCOMM Comput. Commun. Rev., vol. 31, no. 4, pp.
173–185, Aug. 2001. [Online]. Available: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/964723.383073
[21] B. Gueye, A. Ziviani, M. Crovella, and S. Fdida, “Constraint-based geolocation of
Internet hosts,” in Proceedings of the 4th ACM SIGCOMM Conference on Internet
Measurement, ser. IMC ’04. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2004, pp. 288–293.
[Online]. Available: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1028788.1028828
[22] E. Katz-Bassett, J. P. John, A. Krishnamurthy, D. Wetherall, T. Anderson, and
Y. Chawathe, “Towards ip geolocation using delay and topology measurements,” in
Proceedings of the 6th ACM SIGCOMM Conference on Internet Measurement, ser.
IMC ’06. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2006, pp. 71–84. [Online]. Available:
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1177080.1177090
[23] B. Wong, I. Stoyanov, and E. G. Sirer, “Octant: A comprehensive framework
for the geolocalization of Internet hosts,” in Proceedings of the 4th USENIX
Conference on Networked Systems Design &#38; Implementation, ser. NSDI’07.
Berkeley, CA, USA: USENIX Association, 2007, pp. 23–23. [Online]. Available:
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1973430.1973453
[24] N. Spring, R. Mahajan, D. Wetherall, and T. Anderson, “Measuring isp topologies
with rocketfuel,” IEEE/ACM Trans. Netw., vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 2–16, Feb. 2004.
[Online]. Available: http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TNET.2003.822655
[25] (2015). Submarine cable map. TeleGeography. [Online]. Available: https:
//www.telegeography.com/telecom-maps/submarine-cable-map/
[26] Openstreetmap. Open Street Map Foundation. [Online]. Available: www.
openstreetmap.org/
[27] Stats. Open Street Map Foundation. [Online]. Available: http://wiki.openstreetmap.
org/wiki/Stats
[28] Editors. Open Street Map Foundation. [Online]. Available: http://wiki.openstreetmap.
org/wiki/Editors
[29] (2015, May). Copyright easter eggs. Open Street Map Foundation. [Online].
Available: http://wiki.openstreetmap.org/wiki/Copyright_Easter_Eggs
[30] Faq. Open Street Map Foundation. [Online]. Available: http://wiki.openstreetmap.
org/wiki/FAQ
87
[31] P. N. Marco Helbich, Christof Amelunxen. (2010). Comparative spatial analysis of
positional accuracy of openstreetmap and proprietary geodata. [Online]. Available:
http://koenigstuhl.geog.uni-heidelberg.de/publications/2010/Helbich/Helbich_etal_
AGILE2011.pdf
[32] J. J. Arsanjani, C. Barron, M. Bakillah, and M. Helbich, “Assessing the quality of
openstreetmap contributors together with their contributions,” in AGILE 2013, 2013.
[33] Import/catalog. Open Street Map Foundation. [Online]. Available: http:
//wiki.openstreetmap.org/wiki/Import/Catalogue
[34] Humanitarian openstreetmap team: Haiti. Humanitarian OpenStreetMap Team.
[Online]. Available: https://hotosm.org/projects/haiti-2
[35] (2016). Portolan network sensing architecture. Portolan Project. [Online]. Available:
http://portolanproject.iit.cnr.it/
[36] A. Faggiani, E. Gregori, L. Lenzini, V. Luconi, and A. Vecchio, “Smartphone-based
Crowdsourcing for Network Monitoring: Opportunities, Challenges, and a Case
Study,” IEEE Communications Magazine, vol. 52, no. 1, pp. 106–113, Jan. 2014.
[Online]. Available: http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/mcom.2014.6710071
[37] A. Faggiani, E. Gregori, L. Lenzini, S. Mainardi, and A. Vecchio, “On the feasibility
of measuring the Internet through smartphone-based crowdsourcing,” in WiOpt,
2012, pp. 318–323.
[38] (1999, Apr). Apwa uniform color code. American Public Works Association.
[Online]. Available: https://www.apwa.net/content/library/colorcc.pdf
[39] What do utility paint markings mean? Huntsville Utilities. [Online]. Available:
https://www.hsvutil.org/ac/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/APWA_ColorCode.jpg
[40] Waymarking.Com. (2009, Mar). Evergreen tree cell tower. [Online]. Available: http:
//img.groundspeak.com/waymarking/f3283d04-d969-4bf4-9e51-dd9435545274.jpg
[41] (2012, Mar). Cities divided over cellphone towers. The Orange County
Register. [Online]. Available: http://www.ocregister.com/articles/park-342841-cell-
wireless.html
[42] Disguised cell towers. Waymarking.com. [Online]. Available: http:
//www.waymarking.com/cat/details.aspx?f=1&guid=5df351c0-98ea-4b8c-9a84-
844f67beb552&st=2. Accessed: 2016-02-09.
[43] android.location. Android Developers. [Online]. Available: http://developer.android.
com/reference/android/location/package-summary.html
88
[44] Making your app location aware. Android Developers. [Online]. Available:
http://developer.android.com/training/location/index.html
[45] Sensors overview. Android Developers. [Online]. Available: http://developer.android.
com/guide/topics/sensors/sensors_overview.html
[46] Mobile app. Wikipedia. [Online]. Available: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_
app
[47] A. Burnap, Y. Ren, R. Gerth, G. Papazoglou, R. Gonzalez, and P. Y. Papalam-
bros, “When crowdsourcing fails: A study of expertise on crowdsourced design
evaluation,” Journal of Mechanical Design, vol. 137, no. 3, p. 031101, 2015.
[48] Zip code. Wikipedia. [Online]. Available: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ZIP_code
[49] (2016, Mar). Google maps geocoding api. Google Developers. [Online]. Available:
https://developers.google.com/maps/documentation/geocoding/intro
[50] List of new york city manhole cover abbreviations. [Online]. Available: https:
//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_New_York_City_manhole_cover_abbreviations
[51] W. Boswel. (2013, Nov). Why users uninstall apps. Intel Corporation. [Online].
Available: https://software.intel.com/en-us/blogs/2013/11/14/why-users-uninstall-
apps
[52] Position sensors. [Online]. Available: http://developer.android.com/guide/topics/
sensors/sensors_position.html
[53] (2013, Nov). Core app quality. Android Developers. [Online]. Available:
http://developer.android.com/distribute/essentials/quality/core.html
[54] L. Villapaz. (2015, Oct). Apple’s iOS is still getting crushed by Android in the
US. [Online]. Available: http://www.ibtimes.com/apples-ios-still-getting-crushed-
android-us-2130868
[55] (2015, Jun). Php security cheat sheet. Open Web Application Security Project.
[Online]. Available: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/PHP_Security_Cheat_Sheet
[56] (2016, Jun). Security tips. Apache Foundation. [Online]. Available: https:
//httpd.apache.org/docs/2.4/misc/security_tips.html
[57] (2013, Sep). Seeking to record fiber network topology using osm. Open Street Map
Foundation. [Online]. Available: https://help.openstreetmap.org/questions/26483/
seeking-to-record-fiber-network-topology-using-osm
89
[58] Imports. Open Street Map Foundation. [Online]. Available: https://lists.
openstreetmap.org/listinfo/imports
[59] Mapnik. Open Street Map Foundation. [Online]. Available: http://wiki.
openstreetmap.org/wiki/Mapnik
[60] (2016). Mapnik. Mapnik. [Online]. Available: http://mapnik.org/
[61] Osmdroid. Github. [Online]. Available: https://github.com/osmdroid/osmdroid




1. Defense Technical Information Center
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia
2. Dudley Knox Library
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California
91
